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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.

Subject: Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 09 Dec 2016 12:51:04 -0000
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#20348: cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
-----------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  dcf                          |          Owner:
     Type:  project                      |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz          |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > But you can bypass it by putting HTTP-like bytes inside the random
 padding of the obfs4 client handshake. The padding is ordinarily filled
 with random bytes. Filling the padding with zeroes does not bypass as
 reliably.

 Depends net load or something it seems, at 5am of local time no non-random
 random padding is matter Like it counts bytes as long as cpu time left,
 with some mandatory minimum it seems.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20348#comment:144>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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