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Re: [tor-bugs] #21056 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not pick one of the responsible hidden service directories, because we requested them all recently without success.



#21056: Could not pick one of the responsible hidden service directories, because
we requested them all recently without success.
--------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  joeyh         |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs        |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by s7r):

 I confirm this happens heavily on git master with otherwise available up
 and running onion services. It only happens when you open more ( > 1 )
 concurrent socks requests (either to different hidden services or to the
 same hidden service with isolation).

 I won't attach another debug log because this is very easy to reproduce:
 just open at least 2 or 3 socks requests simultaneously to the same up and
 running hidden service but use a different socks username / password for
 each request so they are isolated. The hidden service will become
 unreachable immediately, because Tor will think it tried all HSDirs and
 couldn't get a valid descriptor. It works normally if you make just one
 request at a time, but it's clearly a bug.

 I can also confirm this wasn't happening in previous releases (could have
 been introduced with a socks patch). I used the same script to open many
 concurrent rendezvous circuits to the same onion service to stress test
 OnionBalance back then and I didn't experience this bug.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21056#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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