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Re: [tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
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Reporter: TBD.Chen | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: guard, hidden service | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by mikeperry):
Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
> mikeperry, is this the kind of thing that pathbias is meant to solve?
If we want the path bias system to check for cases like this, it would not
be to hard to augment it to send periodic end-to-end probes for introduce1
circuits, fwiw. We should consider if we want to to that for other
circuits too.
I was hopeful that Proposal 295 (or 261 or similar) would allow us to
remove the path bias code, as crypto tagging attacks would be prevented by
that. However, circuit choking attacks would not be; we would need
liveness probes to detect them. End-to-end liveness probes might also help
with conflux (to more quickly detect when a circuit branch has collapsed
to build another path).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29174#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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