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Re: [tor-bugs] #6458 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Disable HSTS for third party content on non-HSTS domains

#6458: Disable HSTS for third party content on non-HSTS domains
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 Reporter:  mikeperry             |          Owner:  mikeperry
     Type:  defect                |         Status:  new      
 Priority:  major                 |      Milestone:           
Component:  Firefox Patch Issues  |        Version:           
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability       |         Parent:           
   Points:                        |   Actualpoints:           
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Comment(by mikeperry):

 gk: We currently clear HSTS on New Identity, but we do not disable it
 entirely. It's my feeling that an HSTS supercookie is a rather extremely
 visible and heavy-weight attack that is not worth disabling the security
 benefits of HSTS to mitigate. Do you disagree? Should we create a stopgap
 "Disable HSTS" ticket in the meantime until this one can get closed?

 I could go either way. We also have until #5742 is closed to decide for
 sure, since that #5742 probably the current best known long term 3rd party
 linkability vector between "New Identity" invocations.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6458#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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