#16659: TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Leak Host Clock
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Reporter: source | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: - Select a component | Version:
Resolution: not a bug | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by mikeperry):
FTR, I think is is worth complaining to the kernel developers for the
simple reason that adding the 64ns timer post-hash probably *does* leak
side channels about CPU activity, and that may prove very dangerous for
long-running cryptographic operations (along the lines of the hot-or-not
issue). Unfortunately, someone probably needs to produce more research
papers before they will listen.
As far as this ticket goes, though, I agree with the NAB right now,
because the ISN does not appear to leak the host clock due to the 32bit
truncation of 64ns ticks.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16659#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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