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Re: [tor-bugs] #15458 [Tor]: Determine optimal circuit usage for Tor Browser
#15458: Determine optimal circuit usage for Tor Browser
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Reporter: | Owner:
mikeperry | Status: new
Type: | Milestone:
enhancement | Version:
Priority: normal | Keywords: tbb-wants, tor-client needs-
Component: Tor | proposal
Resolution: | Parent ID:
Actual Points: |
Points: |
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Comment (by mikeperry):
Some notes for potential proposals:
On the DontAbandonAlreadySuccessfulCircuits/StrongSocksIsolation side of
this, one additional property we may want is for Tor to reject stream
attempts that would be invalid if sent over a currently live circuit with
the same socks username+password. This would mitigate weird attacks where
sites can collude with exits to redirect a portion of their traffic over
to the only exit on the network that allows connections to
127.23.23.23:25, or similar. It might also ensure that the Torbutton
circuit display is always correct to the extent that only one circuit was
used for the site.
On the TrackIsolationExits side, we'll want to specify what to do about
cannibalization as well as predictive circuit building, so we can avoid
both 4 hop circuits as well as latency while waiting for circuit
construction for as many cases as possible.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15458#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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