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[tor-bugs] #33648 [Applications]: vanguards: What is the recommended value?



#33648: vanguards: What is the recommended value?
-------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  task         |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium       |      Component:  Applications
  Version:               |       Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
 Reviewer:               |        Sponsor:
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 Since your default configuration & github document doesn't tell me much,
 I'd like to hear developer's opinion on this.


 vanguards.conf

 Bandguards:
 circ_max_age_hours = 1  (Mine is just simple WWW service without fancy
 WebSockets, downloads or videos)
 circ_max_hsdesc_kilobytes = 30
 circ_max_megabytes = 5


 Q1. Is using smaller value such as 1 for circ_max_age_hours have any
 problems regarding anonymity?

 Q2. You didn't mention default size of hidden service descriptor. What
 value is it? This is not OnionShare or onionbalance.
 (if you can do {circ_max_hsdesc_kilobytes != normal_desc_size
 kill_connection} that's great)

 Q3. You said "HTTP GET can resume if this limit is hit, HTTP POST will
 not" in circ_max_megabytes. You better add this text, don't you think: "If
 the client reach this limit, we close the connection and create another
 one to continue operation. Client will experience small downtime."

 Q4. Can you add an option to slow down packets on purpose, to prevent
 simple DDoS? e.g. 'limit_packets_per_seconds = 10' will allow 10 packets
 per seconds and delay exceeded packets (x) seconds

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33648>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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