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[tor-bugs] #16206 [Tor Browser]: set security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level to 2 ("Strict. Pinning is always enforced")



#16206: set security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level to 2 ("Strict. Pinning is
always enforced")
-------------------------+--------------------------
 Reporter:  dkg          |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  defect       |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Keywords:  hpkp         |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
-------------------------+--------------------------
 see: https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning

 Please set security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level to 2 ("Strict. Pinning
 is always enforced").

 This will become more relevant as Tor moves to a more recent version of
 firefox (31 only has minimal built-in pinning support, and 35 introduces
 HPKP), but without setting the level to 2, users who are phished with an
 external root CA (admittedly a bad situation, but not uncommon) will lose
 all pinning protection against that root CA (see
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1168603 for more details
 about this risk and circumstances where it might legitimately arise)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16206>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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