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Re: [tor-bugs] #24037 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Use syscall blacklist rather than whitelist for torsocks

#24037: Use syscall blacklist rather than whitelist for torsocks
-------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks        |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement        |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium             |      Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal             |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                     |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                     |         Points:
 Reviewer:                     |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------+------------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 Hello71]:
 > consider that file descriptors can be transferred between processes as
 well. we assume that torsocks applications are not actively malicious, but
 perhaps there is some scenario involving dbus where a torsocks application
 can be tricked into using a un-torified socket opened somewhere else.

 Which is why seccomp would prevent closing the UNIX socket file
 descriptor, and networking-related syscalls would be made to only use that
 file descriptor number.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24037#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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