[tor-bugs] #7549 [Flashproxy]: Facilitator should not give client registrations to Tor exits

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#7549: Facilitator should not give client registrations to Tor exits
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  dcf          |          Owner:  jct
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:     
Component:  Flashproxy   |        Version:     
 Keywords:               |         Parent:     
   Points:               |   Actualpoints:     
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
 Like in #6293, in order to avoid a Tor-in-Tor situation, the facilitator
 should not give client registrations to any proxy that is requesting from
 a Tor exit. This should work similarly to how BridgeDB treats exits
 specially.

 This ideally will use a locally cached database of exits. (Not an on-
 demand DNS lookup.) It should continue to work (perhaps with some
 classification errors) even if the database can't be refreshed for some
 time.

 Roger offered this command, which is used to update the exit database for
 BridgeDB:
 {{{
 cat $HOME/auto-naming/moria1/cached-des* | python
 $HOME/git/contrib/exitlist <ip>:<port> > exitlist
 }}}

 The facilitator should not return a useful client registration in any
 case. An additional question is whether it should send a signal requesting
 that the proxy disable itself. (Knowing that a malicious proxy may ignore
 it.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7549>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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