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Re: [tor-bugs] #18628 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge before the OR data



#18628: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge
before the OR data
-----------------------------------+------------------------
 Reporter:  arlolra                |          Owner:  cmm323
     Type:  defect                 |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  High                   |      Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                 |     Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                         |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                         |         Points:
 Reviewer:                         |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------+------------------------
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I added some logging code that reports, every 24 hours, how many incoming
 connections had `client_ip` set and how many did not. Here are the first
 two reports (they are not 24 hours apart because I had to restart the
 server in between). The fractions are 81% and 82%.
 {{{
 2017/10/20 07:03:00 in the past 9e+04 s, 782/968 connections had client_ip
 2017/10/22 15:19:03 in the past 86400 s, 507/618 connections had client_ip
 }}}

 We have 3 standalone proxy-go instances running around the clock,
 reporting `client_ip`. I would guess that the connections without
 `client_ip` come from the JavaScript code, the live copy of which does not
 yet have the `client_ip` change. (See #23947.) If my guess is right, and
 we assume that a client has an equal probability of getting any available
 proxy, that means that there are on average 0.75 JavaScript proxies
 running at any time (3 / 3.75 = 80%).

 I'm going to close this ticket now. Upgrading the JavaScript proxy code
 will happen as a side effect of #23947.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18628#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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