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Re: [tor-bugs] #4124 [Tor Bridge]: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits



#4124: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
        Type:  defect      |      Status:  reopened          
    Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
   Component:  Tor Bridge  |     Version:                    
  Resolution:              |    Keywords:                    
      Parent:              |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:              |  
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Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:10 nickm]:
 > rransom above correctly identified the long-term solution for A; this
 isn't it.
 >
 > The question I want to answer *now* is whether this patch -- the one we
 have merged now -- is a good idea *now* or whether we should revert it.
 >
 > It makes one thing better: it makes it harder to identify bridges before
 they see use.
 >
 > It makes one thing worse: it makes the circuits that originate at a
 bridge distinguishable from circuits that don't.
 >
 > Is this tradeoff a win?

 Two types of circuits originate from a bridge: single-hop directory-fetch
 circuits and circuits for anonymous activities.  Single-hop dir-fetch
 circuits from a bridge are trivially distinguishable from a bridge's
 clients' circuits.  Circuits for anonymous activities are all sent through
 the bridge's three entry guards.  Most of a bridge's clients' circuits
 will not be sent through from the bridge through one of those three
 relays.

 Yes, this tradeoff is a win; we should not revert arma's patch.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4124#comment:12>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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