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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: teor
Type: enhancement | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.2.9.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, | Actual Points: 11.5
TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
group-7 |
Parent ID: | Points: 6.5
Reviewer: dgoulet | Sponsor:
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Comment (by nickm):
Two more concerns that just occurred to me:
1. Should the 'poisoning' feature work in both directions? It seems to
me that the damage from accidentally making an anonymous hidden service
non-anonymous would be much much greater than the danger of accidentally
anonymizing something that you didn't mean to anonymize.
2. I anticipate that if all the options for making RSOS start with
"OnionService" and all of the options for making anonymous onions services
start with "HiddenService", then people will call RSOS "onion services"
and continue to call anonymous onion services "hidden services." That's
probably not what we had in mind.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:76>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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