> On 27 Apr 2017, at 04:59, David Stainton <dstainton415@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > What was the guard discovery attack they used? > Was it one of the well known published guard discovery attack or > another new one? They did not tell us, but it might have been based on traffic analysis. > On 27 Apr 2017, at 05:06, tor <tor@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Could you share the verbiage you used to refuse the request? Or offer any general guidance for other guard operators in case they receive a similar request? I can imagine there may be certain jurisdictions where refusing such a request might be problematic. I cannot, it was a conversation that involved other people. > Also, are there any guidelines for reducing the log footprint of a relay? Are the OS defaults generally sufficient, or do operators need to take additional steps to preserve user privacy? The tor defaults are generally sufficient. But if you install a caching DNS server on an exit, make sure that no domains are ever logged. For example, bind9 logs domain resolution errors containing domains by default. (I sent a message to this list about that last year.) T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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