Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike

I'm not switching off my relay, primarily because I'm lazy and can't be arsed to figure out what all the politics bullshit is about.

Some project member did some shit and other project members are mad at them. Other people may or may not be righteously mad at the first people for reasons I haven't bothered to learn.

I started my relay so oppressed people in third world countries could communicate with the outside world and each other in relative safety. If that objective is still being achieved by the software, I could give a shit what beefs the coders have with each other.

On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:14 PM, krishna e bera <keb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 21/08/16 10:02 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> Fact: Jacob Applebaum's directory authority was a target of NSA's
> XKEYSCORE:
> https://contraspin.co.nz/the-weaponising-of-social-part-3-the-resurrection-of-ioerror/

Of course, perhaps they all are.

> Fact: Jacob Applebaum got kicked from Tor Inc, prior to a proper
> investigation.

Any organization would do the same with similar allegations. If he was
exonerated, he could rejoin afterwards.

> Fact: The investigation done by Tor Inc, was run by the primary accusers
> of Jacob Applebaum.

Evidence?

> In the USA's war against Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, Wikileaks and
> Edward Snowden, Jacob Applebaum was a very high target, and caused the
> three letter agencies a lot of problems.
>
> So yes, operation of the network you use for -genuine- privacy needs, is
> very much dependent on those running the organisation.
>
>
> Fact: The ENTIRE board of Tor Inc got replaced after Jacob was given the
> boot!
>
> My conclusion: This was a coup, blunt and bloody, take no prisoners,
> respect no righteousness.

Overdramatic. Where's the blood? Who was behind the coup, and what
hard evidence do you have? Are you looking for #torstrike to prompt
leaks of such info?

Makes more sense for the Board to be distinct from the day to day
operations people anyway.

> My conclusion: The operation of the Tor directory authorities can no
> longer be trusted.

Perhaps it never could be. Are you ready to run one?

> My conclusion: The deployment of TBB by Tor Inc can no longer be
> trusted.

Fork it.

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