How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your needs, or might be offline, or simply overloaded on account of there being less than regular exits. By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Regards /peter On 12/07/2016 12:25 PM, Rana wrote: > I mean, why aren’t some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and > temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying > service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would > increase security. > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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