[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks



Hi,
 
On Sunday, July 5, 2020 at 8:45 PM, Imre Jonk <imre@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
 
Hi nusenu,

On Sun, 2020-07-05 at 18:35 +0200, nusenu wrote:
 
[...]
 
b) require a verified physical address for large operators (>=0.5%
exit or guard probability)
(manual verification, low number of operators).
It is not required that the address is public or stored after it got
verified.
For details see bellow [2].

0.5% exit probability is currently about 500-600 Mbit/s of advertised
bandwidth.

That seems reasonable. I currently co-run an exit relay that has just
under 0.1% probability and would be okay with sharing my physical
address with the directory authorities, especially if my probability
would be higher.

This is a great point. Independent of the measures that will be chosen,
they should impact the traffic a relay gets.
Most relay operators want their relays to be useful
and are willing to do put a lot of work into increasing their traffic.
And they should be "rewarded" with flags so that it is obvious
to relay operators that they have an interest in actually
fulfilling the new requirements.
 
[...]
 
_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays