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Re: [tor-relays] Disk encryption for relays [was: FreeBSD 11.1 ZFS Tor Image]




Roger Dingledine:
> Capturing the on-disk keys from a relay will let them impersonate the
> relay in the future

To limit possibility to impersonate a relay in the future, operators can run in OfflineMasterKey mode
with a short SigningKeyLifetime (i.e. 5 days) and push key material via SSH to the relay. 
This will limit the ability of an attacker to impersonate the relays to 5 days in the worst case,
iff the attacker does not also compromise the host storing the Ed25519 master keys.

And if you actually want to do it: ansible-relayor does it by default (with 30 days SigningKeyLifetime).

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