You could use an encrypted disk partition for key storage, but that only protects the keys "at rest", and not in memory. There is also ongoing development work on offline ed25519 master identity keys. The master key need never be stored on the server itself. Instead, it is used to certify a number of medium-term signing keys, and those keys are then sent to the server. An operator can limit the scope of compromise to the number of signing keys on the server. An operator can transmit the next signing key just before the previous one expires, limiting the scope of compromise to a single signing key. There is also work on key revocation, where a key can be cancelled in the event of compromise. See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13642 for more details. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F |
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