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Re: [tor-relays] Relay security, re: local network



On 26.9.2013 23:25, Roger Dingledine wrote:
EFF recommends against it in their Legal FAQ:
"Should I run an exit relay from my home?"
https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq

Their recommendation comes from dealing with one too many distraught
relay operators who had confused DEA agents show up at their house and
take everything including their toaster "because it might be evidence".

In general we've been doing pretty well at teaching law enforcement in
the US about how Tor works:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-october-fbi-conference
but a) there are many other countries out there, and b) all it takes is
one guy who didn't read his "there's this thing called Tor" briefing,
or didn't believe it, to ruin your day/week/month.

So, feel free to do it, but also be aware there's a
tiny-but-hard-to-actually-estimate chance of getting to spend a lot of
time teaching people about Tor.

Thanks!
--Roger

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So exits are desperately needed, but not badly enough to recommend running them where it would be the most convenient to set up, easiest to troubleshoot and manage, and most cost-effective to run (my personal experience and opinion, may not reflect that of others)? Granted, many, if not most consumer connections are capped too low to be of much individual value in terms of output volume, but i recall reading somewhere on these mailing lists and/or the Tor Project FAQs about how important diversity is, as opposed to clustering most exits to a handful of physical locations with fat cables.

I don't mean to sound rude, i just hate the way the world works with these things. Don't we all?
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