After talking with APNIC/RIPE, it looks like that if we ask nicely we can get high-quality BGP-peering graphs for the entire Internet (not 100% complete, but it's the same data they use internally).
Spend some time thinking about exactly what kinds of attacks we wish to harden against. Once we understand the attacks, I'll figure out the appropriate graph-theory for hardening against it.
-V
Interesting, thanks for the update. Maybe we can find some time at the
dev meeting to chat. :)
Moritz
On 09/10/2015 07:12 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> I'm at an APNIC conference in Jakarta, and they demoed a new tool which
> shows the interconnections (peering + transits) between AS numbers
> within a given country (will eventually work for regions).
>
> URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/
> Left-panel is IPv4 and right-panel is IPv6.
>
> Here is the fellow who built it:
> https://www.linkedin.com/pub/geoff-huston/42/828/891
>
>
> For Tor, this tool helps us prioritize the ASs for new relays. To
> maximize censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in
> the middle (lots of interconnections) that do not currently have Tor relays.
>
> We can imagine giving out Roster bonus points depending on the
> AS-number. The points would go something like:
>
> AS_i_bonus_points = ASweight(i) / #_Tor_relays_on_AS
>
> ASweight(i) = k * \sum_{j=1}^n num_ips_routed_by_edge_i_j
> where k is an arbitrary constant (k=1 is reasonable).
>
> This could be very useful for deciding where to put new relays. I'll
> see if I can access to the raw data that generates these graphs so we
> have more than just pretty pictures.
>
> Much love,
> -V
--
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/