[freehaven-cvs] minor patches

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/econp2p03

Modified Files:
	econp2p03.tex 
Log Message:
minor patches


Index: econp2p03.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/econp2p03.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.8
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -d -r1.8 -r1.9
--- econp2p03.tex	2 Apr 2003 02:32:43 -0000	1.8
+++ econp2p03.tex	2 Apr 2003 02:47:30 -0000	1.9
@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@
 \end{itemize}
 
 The reputation systems we discuss below would enable users 
-do not direct their traffic to unreliable nodes--thus giving
-high-sensitivity against to provide {\it reliable} service, and making
+to direct their traffic to reliable nodes --- thus giving
+high-sensitivity agents incentive to provide {\it reliable} service, and making
 the network as a whole more reliable.  Below, we examine several
 designs for reputation systems for anonymity networks.
 
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@
 \section{Conclusion: New Directions, Misdirections, and Other Questions}
 
 Reputation systems are already gathering momentum at the grassroots of the
-Internet. Special-purpose systems---some more {\it ad hoc<} than others---have
+Internet. Special-purpose systems --- some more {\it ad hoc} than others --- have
 already been rolled into online auction services, messaging protocols, and
 online discussion sites. But despite this growing body of experience at
 building simple reputation systems and designing more complex ones for
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@
 Similarly, what can we do when statements aren't verifiable, and where an
 adversary can either lie about real interactions, or fabricate spurious
 interactions and lie about those?  We could try to make credibility charts
-and weight statements by credibility -- but a smart adversary could try to
+and weight statements by credibility --- but a smart adversary could try to
 trick our credibility calculations as well. If somebody finds a way to
 establish bounds on malicious influence on such a system, the range of
 problems we can solve with reputation would explode overnight.
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@
 you get reputation currency? Do currency-based approaches always imply
 transitive trust? Is the supply of reputation currency constant,
 increasing, or decreasing? Does it expire, or slowly lose value over time?
-Where, ultimately, does a currency come from -- a decentralized Federal
+Where, ultimately, does a currency come from --- a decentralized Federal
 Reserve? Does it materialize as a side-effect of performing work from the
 system? Is there credit? Or does currency only appear when the system is
 bootstrapped, and if so, how? Is currency global, or do individual servers

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