[freehaven-cvs] 5 pages

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/econp2p03

Modified Files:
	econp2p03.bib econp2p03.tex 
Log Message:
5 pages


Index: econp2p03.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/econp2p03.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.4
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -d -r1.4 -r1.5
--- econp2p03.bib	2 Apr 2003 02:53:14 -0000	1.4
+++ econp2p03.bib	2 Apr 2003 03:08:29 -0000	1.5
@@ -36,19 +36,15 @@
   year =         2001,
   editor =       {Ira S. Moskowitz},
   publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2137},
-  note =         {\newline \url{http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf}},
 }
 
 @InProceedings{raymond00,
   author =       {J. F. Raymond},
   title =        {{Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues,
                   and Open Problems}},
-  booktitle =    {Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop
-                  on Design Issue in Anonymity and Unobservability},  
-  year =         2000,
+  booktitle =   {Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability},
+  year =         {2000},
   month =        {July},
-  pages =        {10-29},
-  editor =       {H. Federrath},
   publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009},
 }
 

Index: econp2p03.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/econp2p03.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.9
retrieving revision 1.10
diff -u -d -r1.9 -r1.10
--- econp2p03.tex	2 Apr 2003 02:47:30 -0000	1.9
+++ econp2p03.tex	2 Apr 2003 03:08:29 -0000	1.10
@@ -120,25 +120,21 @@
 
 Early work on the economics of anonymity \cite{econymics} has focused on
 the incentives for participants to act as senders and nodes, providing
-three results:
-
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Systems must attract cover traffic (many low-sensitivity users)
-before they can attract the high-sensitivity users. Weak security
-parameters (e.g. smaller batches) may produce \emph{stronger} anonymity
-by bringing more users. But to attract this cover traffic, they may well
-have to address the fact that most users do not want (or do not realize
-they want) anonymity protection.
-\item High-sensitivity agents have incentive to run nodes, so they can
-be certain their first hop is honest. There can be an optimal level of
+three results: Firstly, systems must attract cover traffic (many
+low-sensitivity users) before they can attract the high-sensitivity
+users. Weak security parameters (e.g. smaller batches) may produce
+\emph{stronger} anonymity by bringing more users. But to attract this
+cover traffic, they may well have to address the fact that most users do
+not want (or do not realize they want) anonymity protection. Secondly,
+high-sensitivity agents have incentive to run nodes, so they can be
+certain their first hop is honest. There can be an optimal level of
 free-riding: in some conditions these agents will opt to accept the cost
-of offering service to others in order to gain cover traffic.
-\item While there are economic reasons for distributed trust,
-the deployment of a completely decentralized system might involve
-coordination costs which make it unfeasible. A central coordination
-authority to redistribute payments may be more practical, but could
-provide a trust bottleneck for an adversary to exploit.
-\end{itemize}
+of offering service to others in order to gain cover traffic. Thirdly,
+while there are economic reasons for distributed trust, the deployment of
+a completely decentralized system might involve coordination costs which
+make it unfeasible. A central coordination authority to redistribute
+payments may be more practical, but could provide a trust bottleneck
+for an adversary to exploit.
 
 The reputation systems we discuss below would enable users 
 to direct their traffic to reliable nodes --- thus giving
@@ -200,9 +196,8 @@
 keep track of them. These witnesses are both a trust bottleneck and a
 communications bottleneck. Further, an anonymity-breaking adversary with
 an adequate budget would do best to provide very good service, possibly
-also attempting DoS against other high-quality providers. None of the
-usual metrics of performance and efficiency will help tell who the bad
-guys are in this instance.
+also attempting DoS against other high-quality providers. The
+usual performance and efficiency metrics cannot distinguish the bad guys.
 
 The reputation system in \cite{casc-rep} does
 away with trusted witnesses and proofs in favor of self-rating groups
@@ -235,8 +230,6 @@
 the usual remailer cascade protocol for messages inside the cascade,
 but we introduced a new protocol for sending messages into the cascade
 and delivering messages from the cascade.
-
-[needs more analysis here]
 
 \section{An Example: Anonymous Publishing}
 

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