[freehaven-cvs] a few more minor changes

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.tex 
Log Message:
a few more minor changes


Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.53
retrieving revision 1.54
diff -u -d -r1.53 -r1.54
--- econymics.tex	4 Apr 2003 20:24:44 -0000	1.53
+++ econymics.tex	4 Apr 2003 22:16:04 -0000	1.54
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@
 $s_{i}$ a certain member of that set. Each strategy $s_{i}$ is
 based on the the
 actions $a_{i}$ discussed above. The combination of strategies $%
-(s_{1},...,s_{n})$, one for each agent who participates to the
-mix-net, determines the outcome of a game as well as the associated
+(s_{1},...,s_{n})$, one for each agent who participates in the
+system, determines the outcome of a game as well as the associated
 payoff for each agent. Hence, for each complete strategy profile
 $s=(s_{1},...,s_{n})$ each agent receives the expected payoff
 $u_{i}\left(s\right)$ through the payoff function $u(.)$. We
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@
 We start by considering only one-on-one
 interactions. First we present the case where each agent knows the
 other agent's type, but we then discuss what happens when
-there is uncertainty about the other agent's types.
+there is uncertainty about the other agent's type.
 
 Suppose that each of agent $i$ and agent $j$ considers the other
 agent's reaction function in her decision process. Then we can

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