[freehaven-cvs] a few more fixes

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.bib econymics.tex 
Log Message:
a few more fixes


Index: econymics.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.12
retrieving revision 1.13
diff -u -d -r1.12 -r1.13
--- econymics.bib	13 Dec 2002 22:00:54 -0000	1.12
+++ econymics.bib	15 Dec 2002 09:02:44 -0000	1.13
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 @Misc{advogato,
    author = {Raph Levien}, 
    title = {Advogato's Trust Metric},
-   howpublished = {\url{http://www.advogato.org/trust-metric.html}} 
+   howpublished = {\newline \url{http://www.advogato.org/trust-metric.html}} 
 }
 
 @Misc{anonymizer,
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 }
 
 @InProceedings{Diaz02,
-  author =       {Claudia D\'iaz and Stefaan Seys and Joris Claessens
+  author =       {Claudia D\'{\i}az and Stefaan Seys and Joris Claessens
                   and Bart Preneel}, 
   title =        {Towards measuring anonymity},
   booktitle =    {Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2002)},
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
   pages =	 {126--141},
   year =	 2001,
   editor =	 {Ira Moskowitz},
-  publisher =	 {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2137}
+  publisher =	 {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2137},
   note =        {\url{http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html}},
 }
 
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
 title = {Conditioning Prices on Purchase History},
 year = 2002,
 howpublished = {mimeo, University of California, Berkeley},
- note =        {\url{http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~acquisti/papers/}}
+ note =        {\url{http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/\~{}acquisti/papers/}}
 }
 
 @Article{bergstrom-blume--varian-86,

Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.42
retrieving revision 1.43
diff -u -d -r1.42 -r1.43
--- econymics.tex	13 Dec 2002 22:00:54 -0000	1.42
+++ econymics.tex	15 Dec 2002 09:02:44 -0000	1.43
@@ -211,9 +211,9 @@
 In this section and those that follow, we formalize the economic
 analysis of why people might choose to send messages through
 mix-nets\footnote{Mixes were introduced by David Chaum. A mix takes in
-  messages, changes their appearance and sends them out in an order
-  different from that in which they came in, thus obscuring the
-  relation of incoming to outgoing messages.}.
+  a batch of messages, changes their appearance, and sends them out
+  in a new order, thus obscuring the relation of incoming to outgoing
+  messages.}.
 Here we
 discuss the incentives for the agents to participate either as senders
 or also as nodes, and we propose a general framework for their
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
 
 \begin{enumerate}
 \item  Act as a user of the system, specifically by sending (and
-receiving) her own traffic over the system, $a^s$; and/or agreeing to
+receiving) her own traffic over the system, $a^s$, and/or agreeing to
 receive dummy traffic through the system, $a^r$.
 
 \item  Act as an honest node, $a^{h}$, by receiving and forwarding
@@ -244,11 +244,12 @@
 eavesdropping traffic to compromise the anonymity of the system.
 
 \item  Send messages through conventional non-anonymous channels, $a_{n}$,
+%FIXME should this be a^n ?
 or send no messages at all.
 \end{enumerate}
 
 For each complete strategy profile $s=\left(s_{1},...,s_{n}\right)$, each
-agent receives a \\von Neumann-Morgenstern utility $u_{i}(s)$.
+agent receives a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility $u_{i}(s)$.
 The utility comes from a variety of benefits and costs. The
 benefits include:
 
@@ -373,6 +374,7 @@
 b_{d}a_{i}^{d} - c_{s}\left( n_{s},n_{h}\right)
 a_{i}^{s}-c_{h}\left( n_{s},n_{h},n_{d}\right) a_{i}^{h}-c_{d}\left(
 ..\right) a_{i}^{d}-c_{r}\left( ..\right) a_{i}^{r}-c_{n}
+% FIXME should this end with - $c_na^n$, rather than just $c_n$ ?
 \end{array}
 \right)
 \end{equation*}
@@ -1027,7 +1029,7 @@
 since we must consider both the benefits from sending a message \textit{and }%
 keeping it anonymous. If the benefits of sending the message are not that
 high in first instance, then the agents with low sensitivity will
-have fewer incentives to spend anything to mantain anonymity of the message.
+have fewer incentives to spend anything to maintain anonymity of the message.
 Given that in our model we consider the costs and benefits of
 using a certain system, we can of course extend the analysis to the
 comparison between different systems with different costs/benefit

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