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[freehaven-cvs] more patches
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03
Modified Files:
econymics.tex
Log Message:
more patches
back down to 18 pages
Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.45
retrieving revision 1.46
diff -u -d -r1.45 -r1.46
--- econymics.tex 16 Dec 2002 04:35:42 -0000 1.45
+++ econymics.tex 16 Dec 2002 11:20:54 -0000 1.46
@@ -1,69 +1,11 @@
-%\documentclass{article}
\documentclass{llncs}
\usepackage{epsfig}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{amsmath}
-%\textwidth16cm
-%\textwidth13.6cm
-%\textheight21cm
-%\topmargin0mm
-%\oddsidemargin2.5mm
-%\evensidemargin2.5mm
-
\begin{document}
-%\newcounter{axiomctr}
-%\newcounter{axiomctrx}
-%\newenvironment{observation}{
-%\begin{list}
-%{{\addtocounter{axiomctrx}{1}} Observation \arabic{axiomctr}.}
-%{\usecounter{axiomctr}} {\setcounter{axiomctr}{\arabic{axiomctrx}}}}
-%{\end{list}}
-
-\newcommand{\paulcomment}[2][\textwidth]{
-% \par%
-% \noindent%
- \framebox[#1]{\parbox{0.9#1}{*******************Begin Paul's
- Comment*****************
-\setlength{\parskip}{\baselineskip}
-\par #2
-\\
-\\
-*******************End Paul's
- Comment*****************} }
-}
-
-\newcommand{\alessandrocomment}[2][\textwidth]{
-% \par%
-% \noindent%
- \framebox[#1]{\parbox{0.9#1}{*******************Begin Alessandro's
- Comment*****************
-\setlength{\parskip}{\baselineskip}
-\par #2
-\\
-\\
-*******************End Alessandro's
- Comment*****************} }
-}
-
-\newcommand{\rogercomment}[2][\textwidth]{
-% \par%
-% \noindent%
- \framebox[#1]{\parbox{0.9#1}{*******************Begin Roger's
- Comment*****************
-\setlength{\parskip}{\baselineskip}
-\par #2
-\\
-\\
-*******************End Roger's
- Comment*****************} }
-}
-
-\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{} % The version that hides the note.
-%\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{(**#1)} % The version that makes the note visible.
-
%\title{Towards an Econymics ;-)}
%\title{Open Issues in the Economics of Anonymity}
%\title{Issues in the Economics of Anonymity}
@@ -81,14 +23,13 @@
\email{(syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)}}
\maketitle
-\pagestyle{plain}
\begin{abstract}
Decentralized anonymity infrastructures are still not in wide use today.
-While there are still technical barriers to a secure robust design, our
+While there are technical barriers to a secure robust design, our
lack of understanding of the incentives to participate in such systems
-remains a major roadblock. Here we present some new insights about how
+remains a major roadblock. Here we present new insights about how
to align incentives to create an economically workable system for both
users and infrastructure operators. We explore some reasons why anonymity
systems are particularly hard to deploy, enumerate the incentives to
@@ -112,7 +53,7 @@
military organizations must communicate with other organizations
without revealing the existence of such communications to competitors
and enemies. Firewalls, VPNs, and encryption cannot provide this
-protection --- indeed, Diffie and Landau have remarked that traffic
+protection; indeed, Diffie and Landau have noted that traffic
analysis is the backbone of communications intelligence, not
cryptanalysis \cite{diffiebook}.
@@ -210,11 +151,9 @@
In this section and those that follow, we formalize the economic
analysis of why people might choose to send messages through
-mix-nets.\footnote{Mixes were introduced by David Chaum. A mix
-takes in
- a batch of messages, changes their appearance, and sends them out
- in a new order, thus obscuring the relation of incoming to outgoing
- messages.}
+mix-nets.\footnote{Mixes were introduced by David Chaum. A mix takes in
+a batch of messages, changes their appearance, and sends them out in a
+new order, thus obscuring the relation of incoming to outgoing messages.}
Here we
discuss the incentives for the agents to participate either as senders
or also as nodes, and we propose a general framework for their
@@ -760,7 +699,7 @@
game.
In fact, this model might have equilibria with free-riding even
-when the other agent's type is unknown. Let's imagine that both
+when the other agent's type is unknown. Imagine both
agents know that the valuations $v_{a_{i}},v_{a_{j}}$ are drawn
independently from a continuous, monotonic probability
distribution. Again, when one agent cares about her privacy
@@ -821,14 +760,14 @@
fewer nodes (else traffic gets too dispersed and the anonymity
sets get too small). So, if $-v_{a_{i}}-c_{n}$ is particularly
high, i.e. if the cost of not having anonymity is very high for
-the most sensitive agents, then the latter will decide to act as
+the most sensitive agents, then they will decide to act as
nodes regardless of what the others do. Also, if there are enough
agents with lower $v_{a_{i}}$, again a ``high'' type might have an
interest in acting alone if its costs of not having anonymity
would be too high compared to the costs of handling the traffic of
the less sensitive types.
-In fact, when the valuations are continuously distributed this
+In fact, when the valuations are continuously distributed, this
\emph{might} generate equilibria where the agents with the highest
valuations $v_{a_{i}}$ become nodes, and the others, starting with
the ``marginal'' type (the agent indifferent between the benefits
@@ -836,10 +775,10 @@
provide traffic.\footnote{Writing down specific equilibria, again,
will first involve choosing appropriate anonymity metrics, which
might be system-dependent.} This problem can be mapped to the
-solutions in \cite {bergstrom-blume--varian-86} or
+solutions in \cite{bergstrom-blume--varian-86} or
\cite{mackiemason-varian-95}. At that point an equilibrium level
of free-riding might be reached. This condition can be also
-compared to \cite {grossman-stiglitz-80}, where the paradox of
+compared to \cite{grossman-stiglitz-80}, where the paradox of
informationally efficient
markets is described.\footnote{%
The equilibrium in \cite{grossman-stiglitz-80} relies on the ``marginal''
@@ -1107,7 +1046,7 @@
%
Difficulties in bootstrapping the system and the myopic behavior
-\cite {acquisti-varian-02} of some users might make the additional
+\cite{acquisti-varian-02} of some users might make the additional
incentive mechanisms discussed in Section
\ref{sec:alternate-incentives} preferable to a market-only
solution.
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