[freehaven-cvs] A few minor rewordings and corrections. Probably OK ...

[syverson@seul.org]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv19017/rta04

Modified Files:
	nato-rta04.tex 
Log Message:
A few minor rewordings and corrections. Probably OK to submit.



Index: nato-rta04.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04/nato-rta04.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -d -r1.6 -r1.7
--- nato-rta04.tex	8 Jan 2004 07:03:28 -0000	1.6
+++ nato-rta04.tex	8 Jan 2004 20:43:31 -0000	1.7
@@ -264,8 +264,9 @@
 Tor provides a definitive solution to end-to-end attacks, such as
 correlating the timing of connections opening or correlating when
 users are on the system with when certain traffic is observed (also
-known as intersection attacks). Some approaches, such as running an
-onion router, may help; see \cite{tor-design} for more discussion.
+known as intersection attacks). Some approaches may help, for example,
+accessing the network only through your own onion router; see
+\cite{tor-design} for more discussion.
 
 \textbf{No protocol normalization:} Tor does not provide
 \emph{protocol normalization} like Privoxy \cite{privoxy} or the
@@ -286,7 +287,7 @@
 must be provided by an external service.
 
 \textbf{Not steganographic:} Tor does not try to conceal who is connected
-to the network by someone in a position to observe that connection.
+to the network from someone in a position to observe that connection.
 
 \subsection{Threat Model}
 \label{subsec:threat-model}
@@ -437,8 +438,7 @@
 
 Providing Tor as a public service creates many opportunities for
 denial-of-service attacks against the network.  While
-flow control and rate limiting (discussed in
-Section~\ref{subsec:congestion}) prevent users from consuming more
+flow control and rate limiting prevent users from consuming more
 bandwidth than routers are willing to provide, opportunities remain for
 users to
 consume more network resources than their fair share, or to render the
@@ -609,7 +609,8 @@
 scalability, and more users can mean more anonymity. We need to continue
 examining the incentive structures for participating in Tor.
 
-\emph{Cover traffic:} Currently Tor omits cover traffic---its costs
+\emph{Padding Cover traffic:} Currently Tor omits padding
+for cover traffic---its costs
 in performance and bandwidth are clear but its security benefits are
 not well understood. We must pursue more research on link-level cover
 traffic and long-range cover traffic to determine whether some simple padding
@@ -636,7 +637,7 @@
 so we are likely to encounter additional issues that must be resolved,
 both in terms of usability and anonymity.
 
-\emph{Further specification review:} Although have a public
+\emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public
 byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, it needs
 extensive external review.  We hope that as Tor
 is more widely deployed, more people will examine its
@@ -650,7 +651,9 @@
 
 \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to
 gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and
-learn from having actual users.  We are now at a point in design
+learn from having actual users.  As of writing there is a distributed
+network of roughly a dozen nodes.
+We are now at a point in design
 and development where we can start deploying a wider network.  Once
 we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better
 able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our

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