[freehaven-cvs] Fixed more typos, changed omega.c2.net to alpha.c2.n...

[rabbi@seul.org]

Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv14355

Modified Files:
	pynchon.bib pynchon.tex 
Log Message:
Fixed more typos, changed omega.c2.net to alpha.c2.net, added cite for 
alpha. (Is there a better one, perhaps by Matt Ghio?)


Index: pynchon.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
--- pynchon.bib	26 Jan 2004 08:44:05 -0000	1.1
+++ pynchon.bib	26 Jan 2004 09:43:01 -0000	1.2
@@ -237,6 +237,15 @@
   www_txt_url = {http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/pipenet.txt}, 
 }
 
+@misc{alpha-faq,
+  title = {FAQ for the ALPHA.C2.ORG Remailer}, 
+  author = {Andre Bacard}, 
+  year = {1995}, 
+  month = {October}, 
+  howpublished = {Usenet post}, 
+  www_txt_url = {http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=4q4tsr%248ui%40crl14.crl.com&output=gplain}, 
+}
+
 @misc{prng-back,
     title = {Personal Communication},
     author = {Adam Back},

Index: pynchon.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- pynchon.tex	26 Jan 2004 09:26:49 -0000	1.2
+++ pynchon.tex	26 Jan 2004 09:43:01 -0000	1.3
@@ -65,18 +65,18 @@
 
 \subsection{Goals}
 
-While sender-anonymity systems such as Mixmaster have been available for
-public use for nearly a decade, there remains a need for a secure, robust
-system which will allow users to receive mail anonymously. The system
-should be of equivalent or greater security than the state of the art for
-forward message anonymity; should gracefully handle node failure without
-loss of mail; should be resistant to attack from rogue nodes; and should
-not require a complicated interface or special knowledge in order to be
-effectively employed by the end user.
+While sender-anonymity systems such as Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec}
+have been available for public use for nearly a decade, there remains a
+need for a secure, robust system which will allow users to receive mail
+anonymously. The system should be of equivalent or greater security than
+the state of the art for forward message anonymity; should gracefully
+handle node failure without loss of mail; should be resistant to attack
+from rogue nodes; and should not require a complicated interface or
+special knowledge in order to be effectively employed by the end user.
 
 \subsection{Related Work}
 
-\subsubsection{Reply-blocks and return addresses}
+\subsubsection{Reply blocks and return addresses}
 
 Chaum~\cite{chaum-mix} describes a method of using \emph{return addresses}
 with forward-secure mix-nets. However, the system relies upon all selected
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@
 thus can construct robust remailer chains based on the current health of
 the remailer network.}
 
-In addition to reliability issues, simple reply block systems suffer from
+In addition to reliability issues, simple reply-block systems suffer from
 a pseudonym management perspective. Cypherpunk nym servers such as
-omega.c2.net~\cite{} and nym.alias.net~\cite{} implemented the concept of a
-central reply-block repository, allowing pseudonym-holders to receive
-messages delivered to a traditional email address. Unfortunately,
-reply-block systems based on the first generation implementation of
-Chaum's mix-nets (Type I remailers) allow multiple-use reply blocks.
-Attacks on multiple-use reply blocks are discussed
+alpha.c2.net~\cite{alpha-faq} and nym.alias.net~\cite{nym-alias-net}
+implemented the concept of a central reply-block repository, allowing
+pseudonym-holders to receive messages delivered to a traditional email
+address. Unfortunately, reply-block systems based on the first generation
+implementation of Chaum's mix-nets (Type I remailers) allow multiple-use
+reply blocks. Attacks on multiple-use reply blocks are discussed
 in~\cite{remailer-attacks}. For a system to permit multiple-use reply
 blocks, it must inherently risk replay-attacks~\cite{tcmay}. The Type I
 anonymous remailer system suffers greatly because of this. Type II and
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
 anonymity set, which is a significant security improvement over Type I.
 However, since reply blocks are still being used, the reliability issues
 remain.\footnote {If any given node in the pre-selected SURB is defunct at
-the time mail is set to be delivered, the mail will be lost.}

Reply block
+the time mail is set to be delivered, the mail will be lost.} Reply block
 systems are also susceptible to intersection
 attacks~\cite{disad-free-routes}. A global observer can collect data on
 who is sending and receiving mail, and given enough time and data, will be
@@ -445,9 +445,8 @@
 configuring new nyms, or addressing client warnings regarding abnormal
 server behavior.
 
-We believe that such simplicity in the user interaction
-experience is a necessary component to the security of the
-system.
+We believe that such simplicity in the user interaction experience is a
+necessary component to the security of the system.
 
 \section{Conclusions}
 

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