[freehaven-cvs] interim spell check

[feamster@seul.org (Nick Feamster)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv7618

Modified Files:
	routing-zones.tex 
Log Message:
interim spell check
make citations have non-linebreaking spaces



Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.13
retrieving revision 1.14
diff -u -d -r1.13 -r1.14
--- routing-zones.tex	26 Jan 2004 20:35:22 -0000	1.13
+++ routing-zones.tex	26 Jan 2004 20:38:08 -0000	1.14
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 \label{sec:intro}
 
 A variety of organizations, ranging from corrupt law enforcement
-to curious telcos, % to subpoena-wielding religious fanatics
+to curious ISPs, % to subpoena-wielding religious fanatics
 can passively observe large pieces of the Internet. Anonymity
 networks aim to provide communications privacy for individuals or
 groups on the Internet, but such networks are still vulnerable to powerful
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 network traffic can notice over time that certain recipients are more
 likely to receive messages after given senders have transmitted messages
 \cite{disad-free-routes,statistical-disclosure,e2e-traffic}. Low-latency
-networks like Onion Routing \cite{tor-design} are more directly
+networks like Onion Routing~\cite{tor-design} are more directly
 vulnerable: an eavesdropper on both ends of the connection can quickly
 link sender to recipient through packet counting or timing attacks
 \cite{defensive-dropping,SS03}.
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@
 traffic, to
 complicate the adversary's attempts to correlate sender and receiver
 \cite{langos02,pipenet,defensive-dropping}.
-%Pipenet \cite{pipenet} conceals traffic patterns by
+%Pipenet~\cite{pipenet} conceals traffic patterns by
 %constant padding on every link, at the cost of robustness. Levine et al
-%show in \cite{defensive-dropping} that a small amount of dummy padding
+%show in~\cite{defensive-dropping} that a small amount of dummy padding
 %mixed into the circuit can significant degrade the effectiveness of
 %timing attacks. 
 %Berthold and Langos aim to increase the
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 network, so an adversary of a given strength sees less of the network
 \cite{econymics,bennett:pet2003,morphmix:fc04}; by arranging the overlay
 topology so messages can enter or exit at more places in the network
-(as opposed to a cascade topology \cite{disad-free-routes});
+(as opposed to a cascade topology~\cite{disad-free-routes});
 or by \emph{jurisdictional arbitrage} --- coordinating network behavior
 so each transaction includes zones (i.e., jurisdictions) controlled by
 several different adversaries.
@@ -126,13 +126,13 @@
 
 This threat model is based on the assumption that the ability to control
 more than one AS is significantly more rare, either because far fewer
-ISPs exist that control multiple ASs,
+ISPs exist that control multiple ASes,
 % Is that true?
 or because law enforcement will be less willing to face the increased
 accountability and risk associated with obtaining multiple unapproved
 subpoenas. 
 
-By requiring the adversary to control multiple ASs, we raise the bar
+By requiring the adversary to control multiple AS's, we raise the bar
 for breaking the anonymity of the system.
 
 \section{Background}
@@ -147,27 +147,27 @@
 
 \subsection{Anonymity networks}
 
-Chaum \cite{chaum81} proposed hiding the correspondence between sender
+Chaum~\cite{chaum81} proposed hiding the correspondence between sender
 and recipient by wrapping messages in layers of public-key cryptography,
 and relaying them through a path composed of \emph{mixes}. Each mix
 in turn decrypts, delays, and re-orders messages, before relaying them
 toward their destinations.
 
 Subsequent anonymity systems have diverged in two directions. Systems
-like Babel \cite{babel}, Mixmaster \cite{mixmaster-spec}, and Mixminion
+like Babel~\cite{babel}, Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec}, and Mixminion~
 \cite{minion-design} aim to defend against powerful adversaries, but at
-the cost of requiring high and variable
-latency. Other systems, such as Onion Routing or its successor Tor
-\cite{tor-design,or-jsac98}, support low-latency transactions such as
-web browsing, but necessarily have a weaker threat model.
+the cost of requiring high and variable latency. Other systems, such as
+Onion Routing or its successor Tor~\cite{tor-design,or-jsac98}, support
+low-latency transactions such as web browsing, but necessarily have a
+weaker threat model.
 
 Anonymity networks aim to protect against a wide variety of both passive
-and active attacks \cite{back01,raymond00}, but in this paper we do
+and active attacks~\cite{back01,raymond00}, but in this paper we do
 not consider the details of the anonymity network itself. Instead,
 we treat the network as a black box and consider only the endpoints
 (entry node and exit node) for each given transaction. Endpoint
 attacks include simple timing and counting attacks against
-low-latency systems \cite{SS03}, and long-term
+low-latency systems~\cite{SS03}, and long-term
 intersection or disclosure attacks against high-latency systems
 \cite{disad-free-routes,statistical-disclosure,e2e-traffic}.
 
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
 or a provider.  These relationships also determine which routes one AS
 will advertise to another.  For example, an AS will typically not
 advertise a route learned from one of its peers or providers to any of
-its other peers or providers: doing so would constitute an implcit
+its other peers or providers: doing so would constitute an implicit
 agreement to forward traffic (i.e., provide ``transit'' service) between
 two of its providers, two of its peers, etc.  The AS in
 Figure~\ref{fig:policy_summary} would advertise routes learned from its
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
 
 Since we are also interested in the AS-level paths between the sender
 (Alice) and the mix entry point, and between the mix exit point and the
-reciever (Bob) we must also estimate the ASes where the sender (Alice)
+receiver (Bob) we must also estimate the ASes where the sender (Alice)
 and receiver (Bob) may typically be located.  While usage data for these
 mix networks is not readily available, we can perform reasonable
 approximations by assuming that Alice is located on a home network

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