[freehaven-cvs] e2e: a few final tweaks

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/e2e-traffic

Modified Files:
	e2e-traffic.tex 
Log Message:
e2e: a few final tweaks


Index: e2e-traffic.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.35
retrieving revision 1.36
diff -u -d -r1.35 -r1.36
--- e2e-traffic.tex	26 Jan 2004 02:42:16 -0000	1.35
+++ e2e-traffic.tex	27 Jan 2004 02:32:52 -0000	1.36
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
 \begin{abstract}
 We extend earlier research on mounting and resisting passive
 long-term end-to-end traffic analysis attacks against anonymous message
-systems
+systems,
 % We relax the assumptions of earlier attacks
 by describing how an
 eavesdropper can learn sender-receiver connections even when the substrate
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@
 message distinguishability to speed the attack.
 Finally, we simulate our attacks for a variety of
 scenarios, focusing on the amount of information needed to link senders to
-their recipients.
+their recipients. In each scenario, we show that the intersection attack
+can still succeed, albeit more slowly.
 \end{abstract}
 
 %======================================================================
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@
 \label{sec:intro}
 Mix networks aim to allow senders to anonymously deliver messages to
 recipients. One of the strongest attacks against current deployable
-mix network designs is the \emph{long-term intersection attack}. In
+designs is the \emph{long-term intersection attack}. In
 this attack, a passive eavesdropper observes a large volume of network
 traffic and notices that certain recipients are more likely to receive
 messages after given senders have transmitted messages.
@@ -127,9 +128,9 @@
 increases the amount of traffic he must observe.
 
 Additionally, we show how an attacker can exploit additional knowledge, such
-as distinguishability between messages, to speed up these attacks.  For
+as distinguishability between messages, to speed these attacks.  For
 example, the attacker can take into account whether messages are written in
-the same language or signed by the same pseudonym to partition them into
+the same language or signed by the same pseudonym, to partition them into
 different classes and analyze the classes independently.
 %\item {\it A priori} suspicion of certain messages having originated
 %  or not originated from Alice.  For example, messages written in a

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/