[freehaven-cvs] Incorporate some suggestions from George

[nickm@seul.org (Nick Mathewson)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv16093

Modified Files:
	e2e-traffic.tex 
Log Message:
Incorporate some suggestions from George

Index: e2e-traffic.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.37
retrieving revision 1.38
diff -u -d -r1.37 -r1.38
--- e2e-traffic.tex	27 Jan 2004 02:37:38 -0000	1.37
+++ e2e-traffic.tex	27 Jan 2004 11:02:59 -0000	1.38
@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@
 \newcommand\Ponline{P_{\mbox{\scriptsize online}}}
 \newcommand\Pjunk{P_{\mbox{\scriptsize junk}}}
 \newcommand\Pdelay{P_{\mbox{\scriptsize delay}}}
+
+% LLNCS says that vectors should be bold-italic.  Past publications on this
+% topic have all used arrows.  We use arrows.  Should we switch?
 \newcommand\V[1]{\overrightarrow{#1}}
 \newcommand\B[1]{\overline{#1}}
+%\newcommand\V[1]{\vec{#1}}
 
 \newenvironment{tightlist}{\begin{list}{$\bullet$}{
   \setlength{\itemsep}{0mm}
@@ -71,10 +75,10 @@
 designs is the \emph{long-term intersection attack}. In
 this attack, a passive eavesdropper observes a large volume of network
 traffic and notices that certain recipients are more likely to receive
-messages after given senders have transmitted messages.
+messages after particular senders have transmitted messages.
 % Although these correlations are slight,
 That is, if a sender (call her Alice) maintains a fairly consistent
-behavior pattern over time, the attacker can deduce Alice's recipients.
+pattern of recipients over time, the attacker can deduce Alice's recipients.
 
 Researchers have theorized that these attacks should be extremely
 effective in many real-world contexts, but so far it has been difficult
@@ -328,9 +332,15 @@
 Danezis also derives a precondition that the attack will only succeed when
 \( m < \frac{N}{b-1} \), and calculates the expected number of rounds to
 succeed (with $95\%$ confidence for security parameter $l=2$ and $99\%$
-confidence for $l=3$):
-\[t > \left[ m \cdot l \left(\sqrt{\frac{m-1}{m}} +
-                       \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N^2}(b-1)} \right) \right]^2 \]
+confidence for $l=3$) \cite{gd-thesis}:
+% This equation (from the statistical disclosure paper) is (George says) wrong.
+%
+%\[t > \left[ m \cdot l \left(\sqrt{\frac{m-1}{m}} +
+%                       \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N^2}(b-1)} \right) \right]^2 \]
+%
+% This equation (from George's thesis) is (George says) correct:
+\[t > \left[ m \cdot l \left(\sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N}(b-1)} +
+             \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N^2}{b-1}+\frac{m-1}{m}} \right] ^2 \]
 
 %======================================================================
 \section{Extending the statistical disclosure attack}
@@ -925,7 +935,7 @@
 and that the attacker is watching some fraction $f$ of the mixes.  We
 simulate this by revealing each message entering or leaving the network to
 the attacker with probability $\Pobserve=f$.  The attacker sees a message
-it enters {\it and} when it exits with probability ${\Pobserve}^2$.
+when it enters {\it and} when it exits with probability $({\Pobserve})^2$.
 
 \begin{figure}[ht]
 \centering

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