[freehaven-cvs] tweaks

[feamster@seul.org (Nick Feamster)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv31343

Modified Files:
	routing-zones.tex 
Log Message:
tweaks



Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.33
retrieving revision 1.34
diff -u -d -r1.33 -r1.34
--- routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 17:44:53 -0000	1.33
+++ routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 17:50:03 -0000	1.34
@@ -683,9 +683,9 @@
 & {\bf Tor} & & & {\bf Mixmaster} \\ \hline
 \# of AS-disjoint node pairs & 144 & & & 1764 \\ \hline
 \multicolumn{5}{c}{{\bf\# of node pairs with common AS}} \\
-AS 3356 (Level 3 Communications, LLC) & 42 (29.2\%) & & AS 3356 (Level 3 Communications, LLC) & 291 (16.5\%)\\
-AS 19782 (Indiana University) & 22 (15.3\%) & & AS 6461 (Abovenet Communications, Inc) & 251 (14.2\%)\\
-AS 6461 (Abovenet Communications, Inc) & 21 (14.6\%) & & AS 7018 (AT\&T WorldNet Services) & 234 (13.3\%)\\
+AS 3356 (Level 3, LLC) & 42 (29.2\%) & & AS 3356 (Level 3, LLC) & 291 (16.5\%)\\
+AS 19782 (Indiana University) & 22 (15.3\%) & & AS 6461 (Abovenet, Inc) & 251 (14.2\%)\\
+AS 6461 (Abovenet, Inc) & 21 (14.6\%) & & AS 7018 (AT\&T WorldNet Services) & 234 (13.3\%)\\
 AS 3491 (CAIS Internet) & 21 (14.6\%) & & AS 3549 (Global Crossing) & 104 (5.9\%)\\
 AS 701 (UUNET Technologies, Inc) & 18 (12.5\%) & & AS 14188 (Ashland Fiber Network) & 82 (4.6\%)\\
 AS 209 (Qwest) & 17 (11.8\%) & & AS 23342 (United Layer, Inc) & 82 (4.6\%)\\
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@
 \end{center}
 \end{scriptsize}
 \caption{Jurisdictional independence for typical sending and receiving
-  ASes through the Tor anonymity network topology.  Each table entry
+  ASes through the {\bf Tor} network topology.  Each table entry
   shows, for a sending and receiving AS pair, the probability that a single
   AS will observe both the path from the sender to the entry node and
   the path from the exit node to the receiver.  Names for each AS are
@@ -836,11 +836,13 @@
 \end{center}
 \end{scriptsize}
 \caption{Jurisdictional independence for typical sending and receiving
-  ASes through the Mixmaster anonymity network topology.  Each table
-  entry shows, for a sending and receiving AS pair, the probability that
-  a single AS will observe both the path from the sender to the entry
-  node and the path from the exit node to the receiver.  Names for each
-  AS are listed in Appendix~\ref{sec:send_recv}.}
+  ASes through the {\bf Mixmaster} anonymity network topology.  
+%Each table
+%  entry shows, for a sending and receiving AS pair, the probability that
+%  a single AS will observe both the path from the sender to the entry
+%  node and the path from the exit node to the receiver.  Names for each
+%  AS are listed in Appendix~\ref{sec:send_recv}.
+}
 \label{tab:as_obs_ee_mm}
 \end{table}
 
@@ -876,7 +878,7 @@
 
 Interestingly, these tables also show that jurisdictional independence
 is high when either the sender, the receiver, or both are located in a
-tier-1 ISP (e.g., AS 4999, which is associated with Sprint).  This might
+tier-1 ISP (e.g., AS 4999, which is part of Sprint).  This might
 be because the path from the sender to the entry point is already
 located in a tier-1 ISP, and thus will not have to cross other tier-1
 ISPs en route to the entry point.
@@ -959,7 +961,7 @@
 
 \section{Conclusion}
 
-In this paper, we have proposed that, when designing for dispersity,
+In this paper, we have proposed that, when designing with dispersal,
 mix networks should consider the underlying AS-level paths.  Our paper
 brings to light several interesting, important results:
 
@@ -971,10 +973,9 @@
 
 \item We have analyzed the AS-level path properties of existing mix
   networks and have found the likelihood of crossing the same AS more
-  than once along a mix network path to be a near certainty.  We have
-  also observed that the likelihood that a single AS will usually be
-  able to observe more than 75\% of the edges along a mix path for paths
-  longer than 3 nodes.
+  than once along a mix network path to be a near certainty.  The
+  likelihood that a single AS will usually be able to observe more than
+  75\% of the edges along a mix path for paths longer than 3 nodes.
 
 \item We have analyzed common entry and exit paths to existing mix
   network topologies and shown that, in general, given random entry and
@@ -985,12 +986,10 @@
   nodes with jurisdictional independence in mind.
 \end{itemize}
 
-This paper also creates several possibilities for future work, as we
-have discussed in Section~\ref{sec:design}.  We believe that our work
-brings to light an important insight that will guide the design and
-deployment of anonymity networks in the future: to improve mix networks,
-designers must have a better understanding of Internet topology.  This
-paper is an important first step in this direction.
+This work brings to light an important insight that should guide the design
+and deployment of anonymity networks in the future: to improve mix
+networks, designers must have a better understanding of Internet
+topology.  This paper is an important first step in this direction.
 
 
 %% 	This area has been overlooked in the past;  considering network

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