[freehaven-cvs] minor edits,

[feamster@seul.org (Nick Feamster)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv2966

Modified Files:
	endpoint-tables.tex routing-zones.tex 
Log Message:
minor edits,
and a clarification added to the endpoints table in the appendix



Index: endpoint-tables.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/endpoint-tables.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- endpoint-tables.tex	28 Jan 2004 16:37:31 -0000	1.2
+++ endpoint-tables.tex	28 Jan 2004 19:12:15 -0000	1.3
@@ -29,5 +29,6 @@
 www.geocities.com & 26101  \\
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}
-\end{small} 
-%%\end{table}
+{\em Note: } Web sites located in AS 3 were served from
+an Akamai node at MIT.  
+\end{small} %%\end{table}

Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.38
retrieving revision 1.39
diff -u -d -r1.38 -r1.39
--- routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 19:10:44 -0000	1.38
+++ routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 19:12:15 -0000	1.39
@@ -199,9 +199,10 @@
 network~\cite{riot-remap}. Previous anonymity networks, such as Tarzan
 and Morphmix, aim to provide collusion resistance by comparing the IP of
 each peer~\cite{freedman:ccs02,morphmix:fc04} (our results show that
-this technique is ineffective). In this paper, {\em
-actual anonymity networks in the context of the properties of Internet
-routing at the AS-level} and design ways to quantify the results.
+this technique is ineffective). In this paper, we evaluate the
+topologies of {\em real anonymity networks in the context of the
+properties of Internet routing at the AS-level} and design ways to
+quantify the results.
 
 \subsection{Overview of Internet Routing and Topology}
 
@@ -569,11 +570,11 @@
 network, a DSL network, etc.) and that Bob is a content host located at
 a data hosting ISP.
 
-To generate a reasonable list of ASes senders might be
-located, we created a list DSL and cable modem providers from {\tt
+To generate a reasonable list of ASes where senders might be
+located, we created a list of DSL and cable modem providers from {\tt
 www.dslreports.com} that would be likely senders and mapped these
 providers to their respective AS numbers. To generate a list of typical
-receivers, we sample reasonable sites from comScore Media Metrix's ``Top
+receivers, we sampled sites from comScore Media Metrix's ``Top
 50 US Internet Properties'' from December 2003~\cite{www-comscore}, as
 well as sites that we think might be popular on anonymity networks.  The
 lists of senders and receivers that we used in our experiments are in
@@ -618,7 +619,7 @@
 %% Tor nodes, current Mixminion nodes, current Mixmaster nodes, and we
 %% can compare robustness of the network to zone-based attacks. 
 
-\subsection{Fundamental AS-level Properties of Mix Nodes and Paths}
+\subsection{Jurisdictional Independence of Mix Nodes and Paths}
 
 In this section, we explore the extent to which the nodes and paths are
 independent.  First, we analyze the ASes in which the mix nodes are
@@ -786,7 +787,7 @@
 more likely to result in the same hop being used twice along a single
 mix path, if this is not explicitly prevented.
 
-\subsection{Jurisdictional Attacks on Entry and Exit Paths}
+\subsection{Jurisdictional Independence of Entry and Exit Paths}
 
 \begin{table}[t]
 \begin{scriptsize} 

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