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[freehaven-cvs] Typos.
Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/mixmaster-vs-reliable
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv15048
Modified Files:
mixvreliable.tex
Log Message:
Typos.
Index: mixvreliable.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/mixmaster-vs-reliable/mixvreliable.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.31
retrieving revision 1.32
diff -u -d -r1.31 -r1.32
--- mixvreliable.tex 1 Jul 2004 06:53:25 -0000 1.31
+++ mixvreliable.tex 1 Jul 2004 06:58:52 -0000 1.32
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@
\subsection{Included libraries}
In addition to the standard POSIX libraries provided by the compilation
-OS, Mixmaster 3.0, (the version of Mixmaster evaluated in this paper)
+OS, Mixmaster 3.0 (the version of Mixmaster evaluated in this paper)
requires that the zlib~\cite{rfc-1950} and OpenSSL~\cite{OpenSSL}
libraries be included. Optionally, Mixmaster also links against
pcre~\cite{pcre} and ncurses~\cite{ncurses}.
@@ -751,13 +751,11 @@
All software is dependent on its underlying operating system for a good
source of entropy. Cryptographic quality entropy is a scarce resource on
-most systems\footnote{Systems which employ the use of noisy diodes or
+most systems,\footnote{Systems which employ the use of noisy diodes or
other plentiful sources of entropy have less of a concern for entropy pool
-exhaustion.}, and therefore the entropy sources provided by most modern
+exhaustion.} and therefore the entropy sources provided by most modern
operating systems actually provide PRNG output which has been seeded with
truly-random data.
-% \footnote{explanation of /dev/random , /dev/urandom , and Windows
-% entropy.}
Mixmaster uses OpenSSL's rand\_ functions.\footnote{OpenSSL relies on its
internal PRNG seeded with various system sources to provide
@@ -765,12 +763,12 @@
system call, Rnd(), when obtaining entropy, with the exception of message
and header padding (which is done by the supporting Mixmaster 2.0.4
binary). The Rnd() function is not a cryptographically strong source of
-entropy~\cite{MSKBVB-Rnd}. Rnd() starts with a seed value and generates numbers which fall
-within a finite range. Previous work has demonstrated that systems which
-use a known seed to a deterministic PRNG are trivially
-attackable~\cite{daw-ian-netscape}. While its use of Rnd() to
-determine the latency for a message injected into the mix is the most
-devastating, Reliable uses Rnd() for many other critical purposes as well.
+entropy~\cite{MSKBVB-Rnd}. Rnd() starts with a seed value and generates
+numbers which fall within a finite range. Previous work has demonstrated
+that systems which use a known seed to a deterministic PRNG are trivially
+attackable~\cite{daw-ian-netscape}. While its use of Rnd() to determine
+the latency for a message injected into the mix is the most devastating,
+Reliable uses Rnd() for many other critical purposes as well.
\subsection{Network timing attacks}
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