[freehaven-cvs] Grammar, remove "in order to"s. Some of them, anyway.

[rabbi@seul.org]

Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/mixmaster-vs-reliable
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv23381

Modified Files:
	mixvreliable.tex 
Log Message:
Grammar, remove "in order to"s. Some of them, anyway.


Index: mixvreliable.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/mixmaster-vs-reliable/mixvreliable.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.35
retrieving revision 1.36
diff -u -d -r1.35 -r1.36
--- mixvreliable.tex	1 Jul 2004 09:49:50 -0000	1.35
+++ mixvreliable.tex	1 Jul 2004 09:57:48 -0000	1.36
@@ -63,14 +63,14 @@
 
 The objective of this work is to have quantitative results on the
 anonymity actually provided by two mix software implementations in wide
-deployment, in order to test the actual anonymity provided to the users of
-the remailer service, and to compare the two different designs. We evaluate
-anonymity in a single-node context. In order to assess the anonymity
-provided by the entire remailer network, additional considerations are
-necessary. As individual nodes are the basic component to the network of
-mixes, we aim to provide information to be considered when choosing this
-component.  We have used as input real-life data gathered from a popular
-remailer, and simulated the behavior of the mix.
+deployment, to test the actual anonymity provided to the users of the
+remailer service, and to compare the two different designs. We evaluate
+anonymity in a single-node context. To assess the anonymity provided by
+the entire remailer network, additional considerations are necessary. As
+individual nodes are the basic component to the network of mixes, we aim
+to provide information to be considered when choosing this component.  We
+have used as input real-life data gathered from a popular remailer, and
+simulated the behavior of the mix.
 
 
 \section{Mixes}
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@
 the mix, then the mix itself picks a delay from a \em{uniform] distribution of
 one and four hours. Note that these parameters of the delay distributions
 are configurable, and therefore many remailer operators may set them lower
-in order to provide a faster service.
+to provide a faster service.
 
 
 \subsection{Dummy traffic}
@@ -198,15 +198,15 @@
 the mixes, and use a chain of mix nodes that terminates at a mix instead
 of a real recipient.
 
-Dummies are indistinguishable from real messages as they travel in the
-mix network. Since they are introduced to prevent traffic analysis, the
-dummy policy should maximize the number of possible destinations for
-the messages flushed by the mix. Dummy traffic has an impact when
-analyzing the mix network as a whole. We have made measurements that
-show that the impact of dummies on the anonymity provided by a single
-mix is very small. In order to make the comparison of Mixmaster and
-Reliable easier, we have not taken into account the dummy policies of
-these two mixes in the results presented in this paper. 
+Dummies are indistinguishable from real messages as they travel in the mix
+network. Since they are introduced to prevent traffic analysis, the dummy
+policy should maximize the number of possible destinations for the
+messages flushed by the mix. Dummy traffic has an impact when analyzing
+the mix network as a whole. We have made measurements that show that the
+impact of dummies on the anonymity provided by a single mix is very small.
+To make the comparison of Mixmaster and Reliable easier, we have not taken
+into account the dummy policies of these two mixes in the results
+presented in this paper.
 
 \paragraph{Dummy policy of Mixmaster}
 Each time a message is received by Mixmaster, $d_1$ dummies are generated
@@ -247,13 +247,13 @@
 \emph{recipient anonymity}.
 
 \paragraph{Sender anonymity.} 
-In order to compute the sender anonymity, we want to know the effective
+To compute the sender anonymity, we want to know the effective
 size of the anonymity set of senders for a message output by the mix.  
 Therefore, we compute the entropy of the probability distribution that
 relates our target outgoing message with all the possible inputs.
 
 \paragraph{Recipient anonymity.}
-If we want to compute the effective recipient anonymity set size of an
+To compute the effective recipient anonymity set size of an
 incoming message that goes through the mix, we have to compute the entropy
 of the probability distribution that relates the chosen input with all
 possible outputs. 
@@ -269,13 +269,13 @@
 the anonymity obtained for a large number of messages and provide
 comparative statistics, as we do in this paper.
 
-In order to measure Mixmaster's sender and recipient anonymity, we have
-applied the formulas provided by D\'iaz and Preneel in~\cite{diaz_ih04}.
-The anonymity of Reliable has been measured using the formulas presented
-in Appendix~\ref{form-reliable}. Note that we could not apply the method
-used by Kesdogan~\cite{stop-and-go} because we did not make any assumption
-on the distribution of the mix's incoming traffic (Kesdogan assumes
-incoming Poisson traffic).
+To measure Mixmaster's sender and recipient anonymity, we have applied the
+formulas provided by D\'iaz and Preneel in~\cite{diaz_ih04}. The anonymity
+of Reliable has been measured using the formulas presented in
+Appendix~\ref{form-reliable}. Note that we could not apply the method used
+by Kesdogan~\cite{stop-and-go} because we did not make any assumption on
+the distribution of the mix's incoming traffic (Kesdogan assumes incoming
+Poisson traffic).
 
 
 \subsection{Attack model}
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
 obtained by logging a timestamp every time a message arrived to a working
 Mixmaster node (note that the information we logged does not threaten the
 anonymity of the users of the mix). We have used four months of incoming
-traffic (July-November 2003) in order to obtain the results presented in
+traffic (July-November 2003) to obtain the results presented in
 Section~\ref{results}.
 
 In order to make a fair comparison, we have set the mean of the
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
 constructed a $95$\% confidence interval for this estimate. In this way we
 found
 $\hat{\lambda} = 19,972$ with confidence region $[19,891 ; 20,052]$.  Then we
-performed a goodness-of-fit test: can we reject the hypothesis
+performed a goodness-of-fit test to determine if we can reject the hypothesis
 \begin{equation*}
 H_0: \mathrm{the\ number\ of\ arrivals\ per\ time\ interval\ } \sim\ \mathrm{Poiss}(\bar\lambda)\ ,
 \end{equation*}
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
 minimum recipient (sender) 
 anonymity of around $7$, equivalent to perfect indistinguishability
 among $2^7=128$ input (output) messages. When the traffic load
-decreases, Mixmaster provides a larger latency in order to keep the
+decreases, Mixmaster provides a larger latency to keep the
 anonymity at high levels. 
 
 Reliable delays messages according to an exponential distribution,
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@
 
 \subsection{Source code documentation}
 
-In order to facilitate source code review and verification of an
+To facilitate source code review and verification of an
 application's correctness with regard to its implementation of a protocol,
 it is beneficial for there to be both good commenting in the source code
 and a clear specification for its behavior.
@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
 every input that arrives at time $T$ an output that leaves between
 $T+a$ and $T+b$). Let us call the total number of combinations $C$. 
 
-Then, in order to compute the recipient (sender) anonymity of message
+Then, to compute the recipient (sender) anonymity of message
 $m_i$, we need to find the distribution of probabilities that link
 this input (output) to all outputs (inputs).
 

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