[freehaven-cvs] minor patches from paul"s branch head

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/batching-taxonomy

Modified Files:
	taxonomy.tex 
Log Message:
minor patches from paul's branch head


Index: taxonomy.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.14
retrieving revision 1.15
diff -u -d -r1.14 -r1.15
--- taxonomy.tex	9 May 2002 22:18:40 -0000	1.14
+++ taxonomy.tex	17 Jun 2002 05:23:45 -0000	1.15
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@
 attacker allows them through one at a time until the mix fires, then
 the maximum number of attacker messages is also $n-1$.
 
-\paragraph*{Adversaries} 
+\paragraph*{Adversaries:} 
 The above attack seemingly requires both the global delaying attacker
 capabilities and the global inserting attacker capabilities. However,
 this is not necessarily so. If the global inserting attacker is able
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
 usually referred to as the trickle attack. 
 %As opposed to the treacle attack which would just be messy!
 
-\paragraph*{Adversaries}
+\paragraph*{Adversaries:}
 This attack does not require any insertion of messages, so the global
 delaying attacker is sufficient.\footnote{However, as previously
   noted, the delays could be caused by insertions.}  We also note that
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@
 minimum of $0$ messages in somewhere between $0$ and $2t-\epsilon$
 seconds or with a maximum of $2(n-1)$ messages, in $\epsilon$ seconds.
 
-\paragraph*{Adversaries}
+\paragraph*{Adversaries:}
 This attack can be performed by either the global inserting or the
 global delaying attacker.
 
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
 $2t-\epsilon$ and a minimum of $\epsilon$ seconds, a maximum of
 $2(n-1)$ and a minimum of $n-1$ messages.
 
-\paragraph{Adversaries}
+\paragraph{Adversaries:}
 It is clear that to mount an attack on this mix, the attacker has to
 have the capability both to delay and to insert messages.
 
@@ -730,15 +730,14 @@
 %getting tracked,
 that is harder to track, we should send it at the time of higher
 traffic --- thereby increasing the cost (in terms of messages or time)
-of attempted attacks on it
+of attempted attacks on it.\footnote{Of course this assumes that we
+  can determine times of higher legitimate traffic. An attacker
+  capable of arbitrary message insertions, as we have been assuming,
+  will make that more complicated.}
 %\footnote{At times of high traffic, the mix will contain
 %many more messages than $min$, and to flush it free of good messages
 %will require either more time or more messages from the attacker.}.
 %
-.\footnote{Of course this assumes that we can determine times of
-  higher legitimate traffic. An attacker capable of arbitrary message
-  insertions, as we have been assuming, will make that more
-  complicated.}
 
 Thus the Cottrell mix requires the attacker to be able to delay all
 the traffic to the mix for a substantial number of rounds, and

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/