[freehaven-cvs] final commit: actual slides used in the talk

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/econp2p03

Modified Files:
	slides-econp2p03.mgp 
Log Message:
final commit: actual slides used in the talk


Index: slides-econp2p03.mgp
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/slides-econp2p03.mgp,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- slides-econp2p03.mgp	3 Jun 2003 21:44:22 -0000	1.2
+++ slides-econp2p03.mgp	6 Jun 2003 17:57:00 -0000	1.3
@@ -55,9 +55,10 @@
 %leftfill
 Background on anonymity (economics)
 
-Background on reputation
+%%Why we think reputation can help
+The problem: reliability
 
-Why we think reputation can help
+Background on reputation
 
 Why reputation isn't the silver bullet
 
@@ -70,9 +71,12 @@
 
 What do I mean by anonymity?
 
-We want to prevent an adversary from linking sender to receiver
+We want to prevent an adversary from linking
+	sender to receiver
+	sender to message
+	publisher to reader
 
-Even an adversary who can watch a lot of the network, etc
+Even an adversary who can watch a lot of the network, watch the sender, run nodes, etc
 
 Generally done by using multiple nodes for a transaction
 
@@ -138,22 +142,22 @@
 %%more anonymous
 %%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-%page
-
-Beware of trust bottlenecks
-
-Nodes with more traffic must be more trusted
-
-Adversary who wants more traffic should provide good service
-
-(and knock down other good providers)
-
-Performance and efficiency metrics 
-%cont, font "italic"
-cannot 
-%cont, font "standard"
-distinguish bad guys from good guys
-
+%%%page
+%%
+%%Beware of trust bottlenecks
+%%
+%%Nodes with more traffic must be more trusted
+%%
+%%Adversary who wants more traffic should provide good service
+%%
+%%(and knock down other good providers)
+%%
+%%Performance and efficiency metrics 
+%%%cont, font "italic"
+%%cannot 
+%%%cont, font "standard"
+%%distinguish bad guys from good guys
+%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %page
 
@@ -181,7 +185,7 @@
 %cont, font "standard"
 anonymity
 	High-sensitivity agents have incentive to run nodes
-		so they can be certain first node in their routes is trusted
+		so they can be certain first node in their path is good
 		to attract cover traffic for their messages
 	There can be an optimal level of free-riding
 
@@ -220,7 +224,7 @@
 Attacker or freeloader can cheaply throw away bad-reputation nodes.
 
 Hard to detect/verify a node's behavior while maintaining anonymity.
-We had to redesign p2p systems to support this!
+We had to redesign systems to support this!
 
 Reputation information can be exploited to subvert anonymity...
 
@@ -277,10 +281,10 @@
 
 	Publishers decide lifetime of their file
 
+	Servers trade files around (dynamic system, plausibility)
 	Tit for tat: I'll store your file if you'll store mine.
 
 	Hard: need reputation system to determine who will cheat
-
 	Harder: how do you verify a claim?
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@@ -288,7 +292,7 @@
 
 More open topics
 
-	Are dynamic p2p systems that need reliability and don't allow verifying claims doomed? Altruism, other factors?
+	Are dynamic p2p systems that need reliability and don't allow verifying claims doomed? Altruism, redundancy, other factors?
 	Can we implement reputation with currency? May allow easier decentralization.
 	Incentives: If anonymity for all requires each user doing similar things, how do we deal with users who don't want as much anonymity?
 	Do we have to abandon statistical rigor in the face of dynamic systems and adversaries?

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