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[freehaven-cvs] slight massage to conclusion



Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv20890

Modified Files:
	routing-zones.tex 
Log Message:
slight massage to conclusion



Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.73
retrieving revision 1.74
diff -u -d -r1.73 -r1.74
--- routing-zones.tex	17 Jun 2004 23:59:29 -0000	1.73
+++ routing-zones.tex	18 Jun 2004 00:06:14 -0000	1.74
@@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@
   paths.  If node replacement is used in path selection, the probability
   that a single AS observes all links in a four-hop path through the mix
   is between 0.1 and 0.2; if node replacement is not used, this
-  probability is less than 0.05 for both the Tor and Mixmaster
+  probability is less than 0.1 for both the Tor and Mixmaster
   topologies.
 
 \item Figures~\ref{fig:as_observe} and~\ref{fig:as_observe_75} show
@@ -1429,13 +1429,16 @@
   attacks from a single AS, a newborn network with nodes almost entirely
   in the US is as robust as a mature network like Mixmaster.
 
-\item We analyzed common entry and exit paths in existing mix
-  network topologies. We show that given random entry and
-  exit node selection, even when the initiator chooses distinct entry and
-  exit nodes, a single AS will be able to observe both the
-  entry and exit path to the mix network between 10\% and 30\% of the time.
-  However, if the initiator chooses entry and exit nodes with
-  location independence in mind, she can prevent most such attacks.
+\item We analyzed common entry and exit paths in existing mix network
+  topologies. We show that given random entry and exit node selection,
+  even when the initiator chooses distinct entry and exit nodes, a
+  single AS will often be able to observe both the entry and exit path
+  to the mix network between 10\% and 30\% of the time.  Because of path
+  asymmetry in the Internet, a entry/exit node pair that has good
+  location independence for a forward path through the mix network may
+  not always have good location independence in the reverse direction.
+  However, if the initiator chooses entry and exit nodes with location
+  independence in mind, she can prevent most such attacks.
 \end{tightlist}
 
 %This work brings to light an important insight that should guide the

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