[freehaven-cvs] r1788: Final version for WPES 2007 -- submitted. (doc/trunk/pynchon-gate)

[rabbi@xxxxxxxx]

Author: rabbi
Date: 2007-06-10 22:09:53 -0400 (Sun, 10 Jun 2007)
New Revision: 1788

Modified:
   doc/trunk/pynchon-gate/byzantine-fix.tex
Log:
Final version for WPES 2007 -- submitted.


Modified: doc/trunk/pynchon-gate/byzantine-fix.tex
===================================================================
--- doc/trunk/pynchon-gate/byzantine-fix.tex	2007-06-10 23:29:57 UTC (rev 1787)
+++ doc/trunk/pynchon-gate/byzantine-fix.tex	2007-06-11 02:09:53 UTC (rev 1788)
@@ -40,14 +40,15 @@
 %\subtitle{Improving the Robustness of Private Information Retrieval Without Loss of Security}
 
 \author{Len Sassaman\inst{1} \and Bart Preneel\inst{1}}
-\institute{K. U. Leuven ESAT-COSIC \\
+
+\institute{Katholieke Universiteit Leuven \\
 Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
 \email{\{len.sassaman,bart.preneel\}@esat.kuleuven.be}}
 
 
 \maketitle
-\pagestyle{empty}
-\centerline{\LARGE\bf DRAFT --- not for publication}
+%\pagestyle{empty}
+%\centerline{\LARGE\bf DRAFT --- not for publication}
 %======================================================================
 
 \begin{abstract}
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@
 \section{Conclusions}
 We have reviewed the attack as described in~\cite{cosic-2007-001}, and found that it has significant impact on the deployability and potential success of the Pynchon Gate, as well as other PIR-based nym server systems that do not account for Byzantine servers. A denial or degradation of service attack would be nearly impossible to thwart, and would likely happen soon after the system became popular among users. This vulnerability must not be present in the public system if it is to be expected to achieve and maintain any level of popularity or substantial user-base.
 
-We have presented a subtle modification to PynGP 1.0, relying on nothing more than an additional set of operations already performed by the original PynGP 1.0, to enable the detection and identification of Byzantine nodes with sufficient probability that the denial of service attack against the PynGP 1.0 is no longer feasible. This modified protocol, PynGP 2.0, requires no weakening of the original Pynchon Gate security model, and although it increases the bandwidth communication overhead, the bandwidth costs are still reasonable enough to fall within the engineering requirements of the original Pynchon Gate design goals: namely, that the system's bandwidth requirements be inexpensive enough to be reasonable for both users and system operators.
+We have presented a simple modification to PynGP 1.0, relying on nothing more than an additional set of operations already performed by the original PynGP 1.0, to enable the detection and identification of Byzantine nodes with sufficient probability that the denial of service attack against the PynGP 1.0 is no longer feasible. This modified protocol, PynGP 2.0, requires no weakening of the original Pynchon Gate security model, and although it increases the bandwidth communication overhead, the bandwidth costs are still reasonable enough to fall within the engineering requirements of the original Pynchon Gate design goals: namely, that the system's bandwidth requirements be inexpensive enough to be reasonable for both users and system operators.
 
 We have examined the prior solution proposed by Goldberg in~\cite{goldberg-2007} to address the Byzantine server vulnerability. We show that the trade-offs made in Goldberg's proposal do not satisfy the the security requirements set forth for the Pynchon Gate in its original design paper, as Goldberg's core protocol weakens the security assumptions significantly compared to the original PynGP.%, and introduces new avenues of attack.
 

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