[freehaven-cvs] clean up bib stuff

[arma@xxxxxxxx]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing
In directory moria:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/alpha-mixing

Modified Files:
	alpha-mixing.bib alpha-mixing.tex 
Log Message:
clean up bib stuff


Index: alpha-mixing.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
--- alpha-mixing.bib	9 Mar 2006 01:57:35 -0000	1.1
+++ alpha-mixing.bib	10 Mar 2006 07:32:56 -0000	1.2
@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+@inproceedings{tor-design,
+  author = "Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson",
+  title = {{Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router}},
+  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium},
+  year = {2004},
+  month = {Aug},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{econymics,
+  title = {On the Economics of Anonymity},
+  author = {Alessandro Acquisti and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
+  booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
+  year = {2003},
+  month = {Jan},
+  editor = {Rebecca N. Wright},
+  publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2742},
+}
 
 @InProceedings{pfitzmann85,
   author =       {Andreas Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner},
@@ -115,7 +132,7 @@
   pages = {2--15},
 }
 
-@InProceedings{mix-acc, 
+@InProceedings{mix-acc,
   author =      {Roger Dingledine and Michael J. Freedman and David
                   Hopwood and David Molnar},
   title =       {{A Reputation System to Increase MIX-net

Index: alpha-mixing.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.7
retrieving revision 1.8
diff -u -d -r1.7 -r1.8
--- alpha-mixing.tex	10 Mar 2006 07:24:05 -0000	1.7
+++ alpha-mixing.tex	10 Mar 2006 07:32:56 -0000	1.8
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 batching strategies to let senders specify for each message whether they
 prefer security or speed. Here we describe how to add $\alpha$-mixing
 to various mix designs, and show that mix networks with this feature
-can provide increased anonymity for all participants in the network.
+can provide increased anonymity for all senders in the network.
 
 \end{abstract}
 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 
 Currently fielded anonymous communication systems don't provide
 much protection against a large attacker. Tor~\cite{tor-design} and
-JAP~\cite{web-mixes} have hundreds of thousands of concurrent users,
+JAP~\cite{web-mix} have hundreds of thousands of concurrent users,
 but their low latency and low overhead mean they do not defend against
 an adversary who observes most of the network.  At the other end of the
 spectrum, Mixminion's design~\cite{minion-design} theoretically provides
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
 message. The time the message spends inside each mix (and hence the
 anonymity it accumulates) then depends on the size of the security
 parameter. Our scheme works with any of the standard mix types
-such as timed mixes, pool mixes, etc.~\cite{batching-taxonomy} to
+such as timed mixes, pool mixes, etc.~\cite{trickle02} to
 give each sender more control over the anonymity/performance tradeoff
 of her message.
 % (Depending on the type of mix used, it can also depend on
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
 have passed or a threshold number of messages have arrived.  (Messages
 are actually sent only when the $\alpha = 0$ messages attain a
 threshold however.) Similarly, one can have a threshold-and-timed mix
-to reduce the effective rate of flooding attacks~\cite{batching-taxonomy}.
+to reduce the effective rate of flooding attacks~\cite{trickle02}.
 
 \subsection{Deterministic-alpha mix:\\
 anonymity against a local passive adversary}
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@
 
 Our focus so far has been on steady-state networks with passive
 adversaries. However, we want to provide uncertainty even in edge
-cases~\cite{batching-taxonomy,generalized-mixes}.  An active attacker
+cases~\cite{trickle02,generalized-mixes}.  An active attacker
 can arrange an edge case via blending attacks, but a passive attacker
 can also simply wait for an edge case to occur.  For timed mixes there
 will be occasions when only single messages enter and leave the mix in
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@
 The easiest way to disguise dummies from others in the network is to
 route them in a circuit leading back to the mix that generates them.
 The length of the path should be randomly chosen as suggested
-in~\cite{batching-taxonomy}. Obviously the alphas chosen for the dummy
+in~\cite{trickle02}. Obviously the alphas chosen for the dummy
 message at other mixes in the path should be distributed to minimize
 recognition of the message as a dummy; hence some dummies should
 follow an alpha pattern as if they had entered the network at that mix
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@
 %
 %\section{Dummies}
 %
-%Just as with batching-taxonomy and generalized-batching, we want to
+%Just as with trickle02 and generalized-batching, we want to
 %provide uncertainty even in edge cases.
 %
 %The active attacker can arrange an edge case via blending attacks, but

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