[freehaven-cvs] Coclusion

[aas23@xxxxxxxx]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing
In directory moria:/home/aas23/doc/alpha-mixing

Modified Files:
	alpha-mixing.tex 
Log Message:
Coclusion


Index: alpha-mixing.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.21
retrieving revision 1.22
diff -u -d -r1.21 -r1.22
--- alpha-mixing.tex	11 Mar 2006 00:37:53 -0000	1.21
+++ alpha-mixing.tex	11 Mar 2006 00:53:45 -0000	1.22
@@ -691,12 +691,13 @@
 
 \section{Conclusion}
 
-In this paper we have presented a mix technique that works together
+In this paper we have presented a mixing technique that works together
 with traditional batching strategies to allow senders with varying
-anonymity and performance goals to share the same network. Aside from
-simply letting high-sensitivity users choose to get higher anonymity for
-their messages, the key property it provides is a network effect: when
-\emph{some} users ask for higher anonymity, \emph{all} users can benefit.
+anonymity and performance goals to share the same network and have
+their traffic mixed. Aside from simply letting high-sensitivity users
+choose to get higher anonymity for their messages, the key property it
+provides is a network effect: when \emph{some} users ask for higher
+anonymity, \emph{all} users can benefit.
 
 We have only begun to explore the possibilities and analysis of this
 design. Future work includes:
@@ -708,7 +709,18 @@
 streams. But the \emph{stream model} introduces many end-to-end anonymity
 attacks that seem hard to resolve simply with better batching strategies.
 
-...
+\paragraph{A full analysis of a alpha mix design:} The alpha mix design 
+has added an additional user-defined security parameter and explored
+some scenarios of attacker's knowledge about it. However, the more
+complex dynamic alpha mixes are yet to be analysed; this seems
+difficult as we need to make some assumptions both about how user's
+choose the security parameter and what the attacker knows about it.
+
+\paragraph{User behaviour:} However much we postulate about how users 
+behave, there is no substitute for actually doing so. We expect that
+unless we protect our users, they will try to condition their security
+parameter on the threat level of the message; as we have seen above
+this reduces rather than increases anonymity.
 
 %%%% Stuff with 4s is stuff from alpha strategy section
 %%%% that I didn't want to toss just yet
@@ -929,8 +941,8 @@
 %(AAS: actually, I don't think the above 3 cases are what we want, I
 %think the examples ought to be rather different. 
 %
----------------------------------
-AAS: Not quite sure where this fits in, but it is quite good. 
+--------------------------------- AAS: Not quite sure where this fits
+in, but it is quite good.
 
 If the attacker's knowledge about the users' security parameters is
 limited, the alpha mix closely resembles pool mixes

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