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[freehaven-cvs] Tweaks to the conclusion. Handing all tokens to Roge...
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv26618
Modified Files:
alpha-mixing.tex
Log Message:
Tweaks to the conclusion. Handing all tokens to Roger for submission.
Index: alpha-mixing.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.29
retrieving revision 1.30
diff -u -d -r1.29 -r1.30
--- alpha-mixing.tex 11 Mar 2006 03:19:44 -0000 1.29
+++ alpha-mixing.tex 11 Mar 2006 03:43:52 -0000 1.30
@@ -753,19 +753,23 @@
choose to get higher anonymity for their messages, the key property it
provides is a network effect: when \emph{some} users ask for higher
anonymity, \emph{all} users can benefit.
-
-We have only begun to explore the possibilities and analysis of this
+While we proved anonymity properties for the simplest versions of
+alpha mixing,
+we have only begun to explore the possibilities and analysis of this
design. Future work includes:
\paragraph{Multiple messages and stream-based communication:} This paper
has assumed the \emph{single-message model}, where each sender produces
-individual uncorrelated messages. Much of the reason for Tor's success
-is not just its low overhead, but rather its support for bidirectional
+individual uncorrelated messages. We did describe countermeasures to
+end-to-end timing correlations in Section~\ref{sec:beta-alpha}; however,
+we have not carefully examined the implications of stream-based communication.
+Much of the reason for the success of Tor and JAP
+is not just the low overhead, but rather their support for bidirectional
streams. But the \emph{stream model} introduces many end-to-end anonymity
attacks that seem hard to resolve simply with better batching strategies.
-\paragraph{A full analysis of the alpha mix design:} Here we
-have added an additional user-defined security parameter and explored
+\paragraph{A full analysis of the alpha mix design:} In this paper we
+have added to mixes an additional user-defined security parameter and explored
some scenarios of attacker's knowledge about it. However, the more
complex dynamic-alpha mixes and tau mixes are yet to be analysed; this seems
difficult as we need to make some assumptions both about how users
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