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Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pingers
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv5171

Modified Files:
	leuchtfeuer.tex 
Log Message:



Index: leuchtfeuer.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pingers/leuchtfeuer.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -d -r1.6 -r1.7
--- leuchtfeuer.tex	11 Mar 2006 20:11:44 -0000	1.6
+++ leuchtfeuer.tex	11 Mar 2006 20:23:42 -0000	1.7
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
 %      remailers, so he can easily distinguish her messages when he seems them
 %      at his node
 
-\section{Leuchtfeuer: a unified directory agreement protoocol}
+\section{Leuchtfeuer: a unified directory agreement protocol}
 
 The solution to the partitioning attacks mentioned in the previous section
 involves providing all clients with the same view of the network. Each
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@
 In this section, we introduce the basic building blocks needed for our
 protocol. Due to lack of space, we do not give a formal model here. The
 protocols we choose where mostly developed within the MAFTIA
-project~\cite{MAFTIA}; using new randomization techniques, these protocols
+project~\cite{maftiad26}; using new randomization techniques, these protocols
 are the first practical protocols that can deal with the maximum possible
 number of corruptions, and do not require any timing assumptions.
  
@@ -406,11 +406,13 @@
 % \paragraph{output\_mix\_list:}
 % \paragraph{make\_pinger:}
 
-\section{Conclusions and future work}
+\section{Conclusions}
 \label{conclusions}
 
 We have designed an agreement protocol suitable for use in the asynchronous setting presented by the public remailer networks, which enables mutually-untrusting pingers to come to present a unified view of the state of the remailer network, including the names, network addresses, and public keys of the existing mixes, which can be authenticated by the mix client by verifying just one cryptographic signature on the consensus data. Our protocol greatly restricts an attacker's ability to exploit information about a user's information service or directory to perform intersection attacks against him, and reduces the impact that pingers operated by an adversary can have on the mix-net.
 
+
+
 \subsection*{Acknowledgments}
 
 [Redacted]

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