[freehaven-cvs] s/MIX/mix/

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/batching-taxonomy

Modified Files:
	taxonomy.tex 
Log Message:
s/MIX/mix/


Index: taxonomy.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.8
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -d -r1.8 -r1.9
--- taxonomy.tex	8 May 2002 00:07:02 -0000	1.8
+++ taxonomy.tex	8 May 2002 00:11:10 -0000	1.9
@@ -906,14 +906,14 @@
 Link encryption offers some limited protection against traffic
 analysis. Encrypted links between honest nodes prevent an adversary
 from recognizing even his own messages, thus making it harder to flood
-MIXes and watch where outgoing messages go. However, since the adversary
+mixes and watch where outgoing messages go. However, since the adversary
 performing the flooding attack can choose the next destination of each
 message, he may still be able to recognize his messages. At the extreme,
 he can direct all his chaff messages at the same next mix, so any other
 message will still stand out. A good link padding scheme may be able to
 further frustrate him, but much more research remains.
 
-Babel \cite{Babel} introduces \emph{inter-MIX detours}, a scheme where mix
+Babel \cite{Babel} introduces \emph{inter-mix detours}, a scheme where mix
 nodes can choose to rewrap a message and send it through a few randomly
 chosen new hops --- so even the sender cannot be sure of recognizing
 his message as it leaves the mix. This approach could help complicate
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@
 assumptions -- that the attacker cannot mount a distributed $n-1$
 attack where the hostile messages come from different users. 
 %It cannot be used in mix networks.
-Unfortunately, it seems very hard to reuse this idea in free-route mix
+Unfortunately, it seems very hard to reuse this idea in free route
 networks, since there is no centralized input location at which we can do
 authentication; compromised mixes could claim to have done authentication
 on traffic they instead generate themselves.

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