[freehaven-cvs] Final Tweaks. Final Version.

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/batching-taxonomy

Modified Files:
	taxonomy.tex 
Log Message:
Final Tweaks. Final Version.



Index: taxonomy.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -d -r1.10 -r1.11
--- taxonomy.tex	8 May 2002 00:30:00 -0000	1.10
+++ taxonomy.tex	8 May 2002 00:49:35 -0000	1.11
@@ -790,9 +790,9 @@
 %like differentiation. Furthermore, we can have a non-linear dependence
 %of these two variables.
 
-\section{More on resisting blending attacks}
+\section{More on Resisting Blending Attacks}
 
-\subsection{Resisting exact attacks}
+\subsection{Resisting Exact Attacks}
 
 All of the mixes presented above are vulnerable to exact attacks. In
 other words, the attacker is always able to find out if his attack
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@
 attack significantly (if at all). Thus, we shall not pursue it
 further.  
 
-\subsection{Resisting blending vs verification}
+\subsection{Resisting Blending vs Verification}
 
 The tools that we give honest mixes to protect against these blending
 attacks are precisely the tools that dishonest mixes use to launch
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@
 with the Mixmaster cover traffic policy, a threshold mix network can
 be attacked in $\epsilon$ time (but a very large number of messages).
 
-\subsection{Making messages unrecognizable}
+\subsection{Making Messages Unrecognizable}
 
 Link encryption offers some limited protection against traffic
 analysis. Encrypted links between honest nodes prevent an adversary

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/