[freehaven-cvs] rewrite a few things for space tweaks

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv25564

Modified Files:
	e2e-traffic.tex 
Log Message:
rewrite a few things for space tweaks


Index: e2e-traffic.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.46
retrieving revision 1.47
diff -u -d -r1.46 -r1.47
--- e2e-traffic.tex	2 May 2004 22:12:33 -0000	1.46
+++ e2e-traffic.tex	2 May 2004 22:23:49 -0000	1.47
@@ -224,9 +224,9 @@
 \cite{rao-pseudonymity}.
 
 \subsection{The long-term intersection attack}
-Even if all the above attacks are foiled, an adversary can
-mount a \emph{long-term intersection attack} by correlating the times at
-which senders and receivers are active \cite{disad-free-routes}.
+Even if we foil all the above attacks, an adversary can
+mount a \emph{long-term intersection attack} by correlating times
+when senders and receivers are active \cite{disad-free-routes}.
 
 A variety of countermeasures make intersection attacks harder.
 Kesdogan's stop-and-go mixes
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@
 between senders and recipients.  Such improved algorithms include
 timed dynamic-pool mixes, generalized mixes, and randomized versions of
 each \cite{pet2003-diaz,trickle02}.  Rather than reordering and
-relaying all the messages whenever a fixed number $b$ have arrived,
+relaying all the messages whenever a fixed number $b$ arrive,
 these algorithms store received messages in a {\it pool}, and at fixed
 intervals relay a {\it fraction} of the pooled messages, based on the pool's
 current size.
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@
 Alice, averaging them gives:
 \[\B{U'} \approx \frac{\delta_a}{\B{n}} \V{v} +
                    \frac{1-\delta_a}{\B{n}} \V{u} \]
-and the attacker can thus solve again for $\V{v}$ in the earlier equation for
+and the attacker can solve again for $\V{v}$ in the earlier equation for
 $\B{O_w}$, now using
 \[\V{u} \approx \frac{1}{1-\delta_a}
                \left[ \B{n} \cdot \B{U'} - \delta_a \cdot \V{v} \right] \]
@@ -511,10 +511,10 @@
 
 Although these methods can slow or stop the attacker (as
 discussed below in Section \ref{sec:simulation}), the change in the attack
-itself is trivial: Alice's behavior
+is trivial: Alice's behavior
 vector $\V{v}$ no longer adds to $1$, since there is now a chance that a
 message from Alice will not reach any recipient.  Aside from this, the
-attacker can proceed as before, so long as Alice sends more messages
+attack can proceed as before, so long as Alice sends more messages
 (including dummies) in some rounds than in others.
 
 %%\XXXX{Is the rest of this section even vaguely germane or realistic?}
@@ -927,8 +927,8 @@
 \hfill
 \end{figure}
 
-In our second padding strategy
-(``imperfect threshold padding''), we assume that Alice attempts to implement
+Our second padding strategy
+(``imperfect threshold padding'') assumes that Alice attempts to implement
 the otherwise unbreakable threshold padding strategy (always send $M$
 messages total
 in every round, adding dummies up to $M$ and delaying messages after $M$ as

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