[freehaven-cvs] Last edits; make compressed graphs readable.

[nickm@seul.org (Nick Mathewson)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv2051

Modified Files:
	Makefile e2e-traffic.pdf e2e-traffic.tex 
Log Message:
Last edits; make compressed graphs readable.

Index: Makefile
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/Makefile,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -d -r1.10 -r1.11
--- Makefile	3 May 2004 00:20:16 -0000	1.10
+++ Makefile	4 May 2004 03:21:14 -0000	1.11
@@ -189,10 +189,13 @@
 	done
 
 tmp/fig5d-5d.dat: results/trial5d.analyzed Makefile tmp
-	$(POSTPROC) results/trial5d.analyzed l=1 bg=125 pA=60 m=32 pD p50_all \
+	$(POSTPROC) results/trial5d.analyzed l=1 bg=125 pA=60 m=32 pl=2 pD p50_all \
 	    > tmp/fig5d-5d.dat
 	$(POSTPROC) results/trial34r.analyzed l=1 bg=125 pA=60 m=32 pD p50_all\
 	    > tmp/fig5d-3r.dat
+	$(POSTPROC) results/trial5d.analyzed l=1 bg=125 pA=60 m=32 pl=0 pD p50_all \
+	    > tmp/fig5d-5dd.dat
+
 
 fig5a: tmp/fig5a-4-10.dat scripts/fig5a.gp
 	gnuplot scripts/fig5a.gp scripts/viewpost.gp

Index: e2e-traffic.pdf
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.pdf,v
retrieving revision 1.6
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -d -r1.6 -r1.7
Binary files /tmp/cvsVk8c4M and /tmp/cvsiNp4ys differ

Index: e2e-traffic.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.55
retrieving revision 1.56
diff -u -d -r1.55 -r1.56
--- e2e-traffic.tex	4 May 2004 02:53:50 -0000	1.55
+++ e2e-traffic.tex	4 May 2004 03:21:15 -0000	1.56
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@
 periodically sending messages that are dropped
   inside\footnote{Alice might
   also send dummy traffic to ordinary recipients.  This approach
-  has its problems: how is Alice to generate cover texts, or get the list of
+  has its problems: how should Alice generate cover texts, or get the list of
   all possible recipients?  In any case, it is
   unclear whether Alice can obscure her true recipients without sending equal
   volumes of mail to all of her non-recipients as well, which is impractical.}
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@
 at random.  The simulated background sends to $b-1$ additional recipients per
 round, also chosen uniformly at random.  We ran 100 trial attacks for each
 chosen $\left<N,m,b\right>$ tuple.  Each attack was set to halt when the
-attacker has correctly identified Alice's recipients, or when 1,000,000
+attacker had correctly identified Alice's recipients, or when 1,000,000
 rounds had passed.  (We imposed this cap to keep our simulator
 from getting stuck on hopeless cases.)
 
@@ -963,13 +963,12 @@
 messages Alice sends, but by preventing the attacker from learning how the
 network acts in Alice's absence.
 
-Figure~\ref{fig5d} compares results when
-Alice uses consistent threshold padding and the attacker knows the background
-to results when Alice does not pad and the background is unknown.
-Not only can an attacker who knows the background distribution
-identify Alice's recipients with ease (even in the presence of padding), but
-such an attacker is {\it not} delayed by increased variability in message
-delays.
+Figure~\ref{fig5d} compares results when Alice uses consistent threshold
+padding and the attacker knows the background to results when Alice does not
+pad and the background $\V{u}$ is unknown.  Not only can an attacker who
+knows the background distribution identify Alice's recipients with ease,
+regardless of whether she uses padding, but such an attacker is {\it not}
+delayed by increased variability in message delays.
 
 \begin{figure}
 \begin{minipage}[t]{5.75cm}
@@ -1030,7 +1029,7 @@
 First,
 although real social networks behave more like scale-free networks than like
 the original disclosure attack's model, our {\bf models for user behavior} still
-have room for improvement. Real users probably do not send
+have room for improvement. Real users do not send
 messages with a time-invariant geometric distribution: most people's email
 habits are based on a 24-hour day, and a 7-day week.  Early research on
 traffic patterns in actual mix networks \cite{mixvreliable} suggests that this

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/