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[freehaven-cvs] initial patches for the preproceedings version
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc04
Modified Files:
minion-systems.bib minion-systems.pdf minion-systems.tex
Log Message:
initial patches for the preproceedings version
Index: minion-systems.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04/minion-systems.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.5
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -d -r1.5 -r1.6
--- minion-systems.bib 9 Sep 2003 20:23:21 -0000 1.5
+++ minion-systems.bib 20 Nov 2003 20:38:22 -0000 1.6
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
booktitle = {Proceedings of Financial Cryptography (FC '03)},
year = {2003},
month = {January},
- editor = {Jean Camp and Rebecca Wright},
- publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
+ editor = {Rebecca N. Wright},
+ publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2742},
note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf}},
}
@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@
year = {2003},
month = {May},
note = {\newline \url{http://mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf}},
+}
+
+@Misc{tor-design,
+ title = {{Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router}},
+ author = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson},
+ year = {2003},
+ month = {November},
+ note = {\newline \url{http://freehaven.net/tor/tor-design.pdf}},
}
@inproceedings{rao-pseudonymity,
Index: minion-systems.pdf
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04/minion-systems.pdf,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
Binary files /tmp/cvs2ssafZ and /tmp/cvsWQuPDN differ
Index: minion-systems.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04/minion-systems.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.15
retrieving revision 1.16
diff -u -d -r1.15 -r1.16
--- minion-systems.tex 10 Sep 2003 20:24:59 -0000 1.15
+++ minion-systems.tex 20 Nov 2003 20:38:22 -0000 1.16
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
communication.
Mixminion is an open source, deployed system under active development.
+% XXX call it free software?
It resists known forms of traffic analysis, allowing parties to
communicate without revealing their identities.
\end{abstract}
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@
In this paper, we argue that strongly anonymous (traffic analysis
resistant) communications are valuable to the business and finance
community, and we present Mixminion, an anonymous communication system
-currently in active development.
+in active development.
As early as when the first business-related telegrams were received by an
untrusted telegraph operator, businesses have recognized the
@@ -97,10 +98,6 @@
cash schemes and private auctions: without anonymous transport, these
schemes provide very little of the privacy that they promise.
-In this short paper, we discuss several existing systems and designs
-to defeat traffic analysis. We focus on Mixminion, an open source
-application with a deployed research network under active development.
-
\subsection{Background}
David Chaum launched the study of anonymous communications in 1981,
with his design for a network of anonymizing servers or \emph{mixes}
@@ -121,7 +118,7 @@
wrote the first Cypherpunk anonymous remailer \cite{remailer-history};
Finney followed closely with a collection of scripts that used Phil
Zimmermann's PGP to encrypt remailed messages. Later, Cottrell
-implemented the Mixmaster system \cite{mixmaster-attacks,mixmaster-spec},
+implemented the Mixmaster system \cite{mixmaster-spec},
or ``Type II'' remailers, which added message padding, message pools,
and other mix features lacking in the original Cypherpunk remailers.
Unfortunately, Mixmaster does not support replies or anonymous
@@ -133,30 +130,31 @@
communication, other work has progressed on systems suitable for
faster communication. These systems range from the simple centralized
Anonymizer \cite{anonymizer}, to distributed sets of servers like Freedom
-\cite{freedom2-arch} and Onion Routing \cite{onion-routing:pet2000},
+\cite{freedom2-arch} and Onion Routing \cite{tor-design},
to designs for totally decentralized peer-to-peer networks like Tarzan
\cite{tarzan:ccs02}
-and Morphmix \cite{morphmix:wpes2002}. But while these systems are
+and MorphMix \cite{morphmix:wpes2002}. But while these systems are
more suitable than mixes for low-latency applications such as web browsing,
chatting, and VoIP, they are more vulnerable to certain attacks than
are traditional high-latency mix-net designs. Specifically, if an
eavesdropper can observe both sides of the communication, the
timing of message sending and delivery will quickly link
+% XXX there's a paper to be presented before ours that claims to
+% help solve this. tone down / rephrase?
senders and recipients. Although these systems block
certain kinds of traffic analysis, they cannot defend against an
adversary with significant eavesdropping abilities.
\section{Mixminion: Open source strong anonymity}
Mixminion is the reference implementation of the Type III mix-net,
-which was first designed between 2001 and 2002 to address the (few)
-weaknesses of Type II and also to reintroduce reply messages in a
+which was first designed between 2001 and 2002 to address
+weaknesses in Type II and also to reintroduce reply messages in a
secure manner, thus allowing us to retire the (insecure) Type I
network. Mixminion's design was first published in
\cite{minion-design}; its specification is publicly available
\cite{mixminion-spec}.
-The Type III mix-net design improves on previously deployed designs
-as follows:
+The Type III mix-net design improves on previously deployed designs:
\begin{itemize}
\item {\bf Secure single-use reply blocks, with indistinguishable
replies.} In order to prevent attacks on earlier systems in which
@@ -202,8 +200,8 @@
\begin{itemize}
\item {\bf Usability and client implementation.} For an anonymity
system to hide its users' communications, it must have many users to
- hide them among. (Thus usability directly affects security
- \cite{econymics,back01}.) The current Mixminion client runs only from a
+ hide them among: thus usability directly affects security
+ \cite{econymics,back01}. The current Mixminion client runs only from a
command line on Unix-like platforms, though a Windows32 client is
planned within the next few months. For maximum user acceptance,
more work is needed to integrate Mixminion with existing email
@@ -249,9 +247,8 @@
hide its traffic among traffic from other organizations. Thus,
finance organizations that need to resist traffic analysis have an
incentive to seek common solutions that not only meet their own needs,
-but that will attract as many users as possible. The more users an
-anonymity system has, the more anonymity it provides
-them.\cite{econymics} The same reasoning gives non-business users an
+but that will attract as many users as possible.\cite{econymics} The
+same reasoning gives non-business users an
incentive to construct their systems to meet the needs of business and
financial communities.
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