[freehaven-cvs] a slightly cleaner conclusion

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/batching-taxonomy

Modified Files:
	taxonomy.tex 
Log Message:
a slightly cleaner conclusion


Index: taxonomy.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.23
retrieving revision 1.24
diff -u -d -r1.23 -r1.24
--- taxonomy.tex	6 Sep 2002 06:07:42 -0000	1.23
+++ taxonomy.tex	6 Sep 2002 18:51:34 -0000	1.24
@@ -327,9 +327,7 @@
 is the scenario of a spy in a hostile country --- if the anonymity is
 compromised, the spy is caught.) On the other hand, if timeliness of
 message delivery is crucial and anonymity is a bonus, the timed mix is
-ideal. 
-%The attentive reader will also 
-Notice that if the messages are
+ideal. Notice that if the messages are
 assumed to arrive at a constant rate, the properties of these mixes
 are exactly equivalent.
 
@@ -1027,15 +1025,20 @@
 certain categories of vulnerability but emphasize that the cost and
 worst case attack scenario are important qualities to consider.
 
-Although we show the mixes to be rather vulnerable to active
-attacks, some avenues still have hope. The first of these is
-verification schemes.
+Simple timed mixes seem best for anonymity infrastructures that require
+low latency. On the other hand, if we do not need guaranteed low latency,
+adding a pool to the mix can significantly improve anonymity. Allowing the
+pool to process a fraction of waiting messages (above a certain threshold)
+each round further improves robustness against flooding attacks designed
+to flush out a target message.  
+%sustained flooding attacks designed to
+%drive up message latency arbitrarily.
 
-The second and the more widely used solution is cover traffic. Here we
-assess the cover traffic policy used in Mixmaster, point out
-weaknesses, and discuss some approaches to strengthening its dummy
-policy.
-% we didn't really talk this much about cover traffic. hrm.
+Although we show the mixes to be rather vulnerable to active attacks, some
+avenues still have hope. The first of these is verification schemes. We
+also touch on cover traffic, a more widely used solution. We assess
+the cover traffic policy used in Mixmaster, point out weaknesses, and
+discuss some approaches to strengthening its dummy policy.
 
 The paper can also be treated as a tutorial on the different styles of
 mixes and as a recommendation to the Mixmaster implementors to alter

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