[freehaven-cvs] headings for draft and pages.

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Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
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Modified Files:
	econymics.tex 
Log Message:
headings for draft and pages.
revised example



Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- econymics.tex	13 Sep 2002 08:58:20 -0000	1.3
+++ econymics.tex	13 Sep 2002 17:27:16 -0000	1.4
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 \usepackage{graphicx}
 \usepackage{amsmath}
 
+
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@@ -88,7 +89,12 @@
 Naval Research Lab
 \email{(syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)}}
 
+
+
 \maketitle
+\pagestyle{myheadings} \markboth{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}
+
+
 
 \begin{abstract}
 
@@ -465,13 +471,27 @@
 thousand agents sending messages at regular intervals (no more than
 one message per agent is sent to any incoming node at a time), that
 the probability of any node being compromised is $0.1$, and that
-messages pass through three nodes before exiting the network. If an
-agent runs a mix node with firing threshold of 50, then the worst
-probability of anonymity loss a message he sends can have is $.02
-\times .1 \times .1 = .0002$. If he does not run a node, then the
-worst probability is five times that.  $v_{i}$ is the disutility an
-agent derives
-from its message being exposed; we assume that $v_{i}=\left[ v_{L},v_{H}%
+messages pass through three nodes before exiting the network. Assume
+that routes are chosen at random unless the sender owns a node. In
+that case the sender uses his own node as the first one and chooses
+the next two at random. If an agent does not run a node, then the
+probality that he will by identified with certainty as the sender of a
+message that exits the mix network is $.001$.  If an agent runs a mix
+node with firing threshold of $50$, then amongst messages leaving the
+mix net a passive adversary can with certainty reduce the anonymity
+set (the set of possible messages that might be the sender's) to no
+less than $50$. And the probability of even doing that is the
+probability that all of the messages from the relevant mix batch pass
+only through bad nodes on the remaining two hops, i.e, $10^{-100}$. If
+we pessimistically equate the probability of guessing a message with
+the probability of identifying it with certainty, then the increase in
+anonymity acheived by running ones own node here is $2 \times
+10^{99}$.  This example incorporates alot of simplifying assumptions,
+e.g., about patterns of sending messages and adversary passivity.
+Nonetheless, it should be clear that there is a large potential gain
+from running one's own node.  $v_{i}$ is the disutility an agent
+derives from its message being exposed; we assume that
+$v_{i}=\left[ v_{L},v_{H}%
 \right] $. $c_{s},c_{h}\left( n_{s}\right) ,c_{n}$ are the costs of
 sending a message through the mix-net system, acting as node when
 there are $n$ agents sending messages, and sending messages through a

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